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INTRODUCTION
Section 32 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action on behalf
of the owner of a federally registered trademark, service mark,
collective mark, certification mark, or trade dress against anyone
who, without consent, uses in interstate commerce a "reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the registered mark or
trade dress.1 Similarly, section 43(a) of the Act allows the owners
The relevant text reads:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988) [hereinafter 'section 32"].
Under the federal Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter "the Act"], a
"trademark" may be "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' that
may be used by its owner "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown." In contrast, a "certification mark" is a mark that certifies
such things as a product's regional origin or mode of manufacture, while "collective marks"
include designations indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Consistent with the terminology employed by the
Lanham Act, see, eg., id., the term "marks" as used in this Article collectively refers to all
of these designations unless otherwise noted.
In contrast to the types of marks discussed immediately supra, which are expressly defined
by the Act, the concept of protectable "trade dress" is largely a judicial creation. " Trade
dress' is defined as 'the total image of a product and may include features such as size,
shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques."
AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.
1986) (quoting John Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 515, 529 (11th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). Although, like
trademarks, service marks, collective marks, and certification marks, trade dresses may be
federally registered, see, eg., McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435, 435, 150 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1966) (permitting federal registration of yellow parabolic arches
3
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of registered or unregistered marks or trade dresses to bring
infringement actions against defendants using "false designation[s]
of origin."' Successful plaintiffs under these sections may enjoy
used in design of plaintiffs buildings), the majority of trade dress infringement cases involve
owners of unregistered trade dresses proceeding under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter "section 43(a)]. For the text of this
provision, see infra note 2.
The relevant text reads:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
In contrast to section 32, which provides for a cause of action only against the infringement
of registered marks and trade dresses, section 43(a) allows for the owners of both registered
and unregistered designations of origin. Although the owner of a registered mark or trade
dress may therefore seek protection under section 43(a), see, eg., University of Ga. Athletic
Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1537-38, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1123 (11th Cir. 1985)
(unregistered design mark), the provision also is frequently invoked by owners of
unregistered trade dresses. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1167-68,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1129 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (product configuration of
lamp); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,970-71,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
515, 519 (11th Cir. 1983) (configuration of check stub); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754 (11th Cir. 1982) (selling
techniques); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192, 213
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91, 95 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (appearance of suntan lotion bottle); Alum-A-
Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556, 556-57, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68,
68 (5th Cir. 1971) (configuration of folding aluminum shutters).
Notwithstanding the availability of section 43(a), however, a would-be plaintiffs decision
not to register its mark or trade dress is not without its costs. More specifically, an
unregistered user seeking to enjoin a competitor's misappropriation of its mark or trade
dress must, prior to demonstrating infringement, establish that the mark or trade dress
serves as a distinct indicator of origin for its goods or services in that it either is (a)
inherently distinctive; or (b) has acquired a unique association with the plaintiff, or so-called
.secondary meaning.' See generally Laite, 756 F.2d at 1540-41, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1126-
27 (plaintiff must prove secondary meaning when protection is sought for descriptive mark);
see also Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,283 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life
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the remedies provided for in section 34 of the Act subject to "the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable."'
The test for determining if a particular defendant has violated
either section 32 or section 43(a) is whether the defendant's actions
have created a likelihood of confusion that its goods or services are
produced, sponsored, certified, or approved by the plaintiff or,
alternatively, that the plaintiffs goods are produced, sponsored,
certified, or approved by the defendant.' Whether the defendant's
use of its mark is, in fact, likely to result in any of these types of
confusion typically turns on an examination of the entire context in
which the parties use their marks."
This Article surveys applications by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and its predecessor court, the
Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1974). Beyond these
requirements, a plaintiff seeking to protect an unregistered trade dress bears the additional
burden of demonstrating that the trade dress is 'nonfunctional,* or, in other words,
unnecessary for competitors to use to compete effectively. See, eg., Bauer Lamp, 941 F.2d
at 1170, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131 (per curiam) (plaintiff must prove 3 elements to
establish trade dress ifingement: secondary meaning, that features are nonfunctional and
that two products are confusingly similar). On these requirements generally, see infra notes
141-186 and accompanying text.
s 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1988).
'"[F]asely suggesting afliation with the trademark owner in a manner likely to cause
confusion as to source or sponsorship constitutes infringement." Professional Golfers Ass'n
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 451 (5th Cir.
1975) (quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 488,
168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368,388,193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649,667 (5th Cir. 1977)
('Tlrademark infringement occurs... when the use sought to be enjoined is likely to confuse
purchasers with respect to such things as the product's source, its endorsement by the
plaintiff, or its connection with the plaintiff.'), cf. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d
833, 839, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 16 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that no cognizable distinction
exists between tests for infringement under sections 32 and 43(a)).
The usual case presenting allegations of infringement involves a smaller defendant accused
of having appropriated the good will of a larger user's mark. Under the doctrine of 'reverse
confusion,* however, infringement also occurs whenever consumers are likely to believe the
goods or services of a first user are actually those of a second, larger entrant into a market.
To protect the rights of both the public and smaller companies, [r]everse [c]onfusion has now
become a recognized doctrine within the scope of unfair competition .... * Capital Films
Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 393, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 253 (5th Cir.
1980).
5 See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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former United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,6 of
likelihood of confusion doctrine under section 32 and section 43(a),
as well as under the common law. This Article first traces the
evolution of the court's conception of the likelihood of confusion test
from the test's early origins under the common law of infringement
to its current doctrinal formulation under the Lanham Act. Part
Two of the Article then examines the varying treatments accorded
by the court to each of the factors in its modern multifactored
likelihood of confusion analysis.
I. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION DOCTR[NE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION DETERMINATIONS BEFORE ROTO-
ROOTER
Under the common law, a cause of action existed (and continues
to exist) for the "palming off' of products or, in other words, for the
misrepresentation of the source of one's goods or services through
the use of a mark or trade dress confusingly similar to that of a
6 Prior to October 1, 1981, the Fifth Circuit consisted of the states of Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Pursuant to the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978), which permitted all circuit courts of appeal
consisting of more than fifteen active judges to divide themselves into administrative units,
the Fifth Circuit created two such units: Unit A, which was composed of Texas, Louisiana,
and Mississippi, and Unit B, which was composed of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. Two
years later, through the passage of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980), this division was made complete, with Unit
A becoming the modern Fifth Circuit and Unit B becoming the new Eleventh Circuit. See
generally John C. Godbold, The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals--The First Ten Years, 43
MERCER L REv. 961, 962-63 (1992) (examining background, structure, and judicial
assignments of the Eleventh Circuit). In two of its earliest decisions, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the case law of the former Fifth Circuit and Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit as
its governing body of precedent unless and until that precedent is overruled or modified by
the court sitting en banc. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982);
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209-11 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc); cf. Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 n.14, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
745, 753 n.14 (11th Cir. 1982) (modem Fifth Circuit decisions, although not binding in
Eleventh Circuit, are nevertheless entitled to great weight if based on cases from former
Fifth Circuit).
Unless otherwise noted, all references by this Article to 'the court' collectively mean the
Eleventh Circuit and the former Fifth Circuit. References to 'the modern Fifth Circuit"
mean the Fifth Circuit as currently composed.
6
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competitor. As the Supreme Court summarized this rule in 1891:
The first appropriator of a name or device pointing to
his ownership, or which, by being associated with
articles of trade, has acquired an understood refer-
ence to the originator or manufacturer of the articles,
is injured whenever another adopts the same name
or device for similar articles, because such adoption
is, in effect, representing falsely that the productions
of the latter are those of the former. Thus the
custom and advantages to which the enterprise and
skill of the first appropriator had given him a just
right are abstracted for another's use, and this is
done by deceiving the public, by inducing the public
to purchase the goods and manufactures of one
person supposing them to be those of another.7
Notwithstanding widespread judicial recognition of this general
rule of law by state courts within the former Fifth Circuit, their
decisions provided little guidance to the factors properly governing
determinations of whether infringement existed. To the extent that
these courts addressed the issue, their treatment was similar to
that of the Georgia Supreme Court, which adhered to the position
that "[t]he principle on which courts of equity proceed in restrain-
ing the simulation of names is not that there is property acquired
by one party in the name, but to prevent fraud and deception...
[by] the party charged with the simulation of a name used by
another .... " Consequently, these courts generally limited
injunctive relief against infringement to those situations in which
the defendant sought intentionally to "pass off' its goods as those
of the plaintiff-
[Unfair competition] is the palming off by one of his
goods as the goods of another, and nothing less than
conduct tending to pass off one man's goods or
business as the goods or business of another will
Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546 (1891).
'Atlanta Paper Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 184 Ga. 205, 212 (1937).
1994]
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constitute unfair competition. The basic principle of
the law of unfair competition is that no one has a
right to dress up his goods or business or otherwise
represent the same in such a manner as to deceive
an intending purchaser and induce him to believe he
is buying the goods of another, and that no one has
a right to avail himself of another's favorable reputa-
tion in order to sell his own goods."
Consistent with this doctrinal framework, early applications of
the common law of unfair competition by the former Fifth Circuit
also placed heavy emphasis on the presence or absence of a
defendant's malignant intent. Thus, for example, in Continental
Insurance Co. v. Continental Fire Ass'n,"0 the court upheld the
denial of a preliminary injunction in a dispute between two
insurance companies after finding that "[tihe word 'Continental' as
a part of the defendant's corporate name has not deceived anybody,
and was not adopted for the purpose of deceiving anybody."1' In
contrast, however, the court upheld entry of a preliminary injunc-
tion in Vick Medicine Co. v. Vick Chemical Co."2 on the basis of
the trial court's determination that "the moving cause for the
adoption of [the infringing mark] was to obtain the benefit of the
widespread publicity of that name, resulting from the money and
efforts of the appellee, and for the purpose of appropriating a part
of the good will of the appellee."1
Although this early test for infringement focused almost exclu-
sively on the defendant's affirmative intent (or lack thereof) to
deceive consumers, the court gradually drifted away from this strict
"passing off' standard beginning in the 1930s. In the 1937 case of
' Id. at 213.
'0 101 F. 255 (5th Cir. 1900).
11 Id. at 256.
'2 11 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1926).
' Id. at 34-35; see also Centaur Co. v. Hughes Bros., 91 F. 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1898)
(upholding injunction against defendants' use of infringing medicine packaging on ground
that "respondents' packages of the remedy have been so bottled, labeled, prepared, and put
upon the market, in such form as is calculated to deceive, and does deceive, the public into
the belief that they are buying the preparation manufactured and put up by the complain-
ant").
[Vol. 2:57
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Rhea v. Bacon,1' for example, the court upheld entry of injunctive
relief on the basis of the defendants' bad faith intent to deceive
would-be guests of the plaintiff's hotel.1" In doing so, however, the
court noted in passing that the defendants had adopted the same
decor as the plaintiff's place of business and also catered to the
same guest base.' Similarly, in Greyhound Corp. v. Goberna,17
a 1942 panel of the court found probative of infringement the
engagement by the defendant and plaintiff in the related business-
es of conducting tours and transportation, respectively.'"
The court's original heavy reliance on a scienter standard for
infringement received its final blow with the 1946 passage of the
Lanham Act, pursuant to section 22 of which federal registrants
enjoy nationwide constructive notice of their ownership of their
rights."1 Following the enactment of this provision, at least with
respect to federally registered marks, the presence or absence of a
defendant's good faith became of dramatically reduced conse-
quence.20 Despite the demise of the "palming off" test, however,
the court did not quickly advance an alternative doctrinal frame-
work to take its place.
B. THE ROTO-ROOTER TEST
The absence of a doctrinal framework governing determinations
of whether confusion was likely between two designations of origin
continued until the court's 1975 decision in Roto-Rooter Corp. v.
O'Neal.2 In Roto-Rooter, which involved allegations of infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's federally registered ROTO-ROOTER service
mark by the defendant's unregistered use of ROTARY DE-ROOT-
ING, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs case after finding no
14 87 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1937).
' Id. at 977.
'Id.
17128 F.2d 806,54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45 (5th Cir. 1942).
Id. at 807, 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 47.
15 U.S.C. , 1091 (1988).
See, eg., John IL Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 114-15, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
728, 734 (5th Cir. 1966) (eliminating good faith defense affords registrant nationwide
protection for its registered marks).
"z 513 F.2d 44, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73 (5th Cir. 1975).
1994]
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"statistically significant" evidence of actual confusion.' On
appeal, however, the former Fifth Circuit overturned the district
court's heavy reliance on actual confusion as a relevant factor and
instead drew upon its prior case law to articulate for the first time
a comprehensive multifactored test:
In this circuit likelihood of confusion is determined
by evaluating a variety of factors including the type
of trademark at issue; similarity of design; similarity
of product; identity of retail outlets and purchasers;
identity of advertising media utilized; defendant's
intent; and actual confusion. While proof of actual
confusion is not required to sustain a claim of in-
fringement, the view of this court is that it is the
best evidence of likelihood of confusion.'
2 See id. at 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 74. On defining "actual confusion" and its
significance under the court's modem doctrinal framework, see infra notes 332-376 and
accompanying text.
" 513 F.2d at 45-46, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 74 (footnotes and citation omitted).
Note that the court generally regards this test as identical to that applied to state law
infringement causes of action. See, eg., University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laits, 756 F.2d
1535, 1539 n.11, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122,1131 nl (11th Cir. 1985) (applying identical test
under federal and Georgia law); see also Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.3,
224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 560 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying identical tests under federal and
Florida law).
For the multifactored tests employed by the other circuits, see generally Boston Athletic
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690, 1695-96 (1st Cir. 1989)
(applying eight factor test); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1314, 1316 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying six factor test); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover
Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 913, 916 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying
four factor test); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
595, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying seven factor test); Pizzeria Uno
Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527,224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying
seven factor test); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying
ten factor test); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 15, 19-20 (6th Cir.) (applying eight factor test), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916
(1982); AMP, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808, 814 (9th
Cir. 1979) (applying eight factor test); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co.,
560 F.2d 1325, 1330, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 218, 220 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying seven factor
test), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); In re E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.PA. 1973) (applying thirteen factor test); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 705, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 654 (2d Cir.
1970) (applying seven factor test), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
10
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Subsequent applications of this test by the former Fifth Circuit
and Eleventh Circuit have established a two-tiered standard of
review for a lower tribunal's determination of whether confusion is
likely. Although the former Fifth Circuit held in B.H. Bunn Co. v.
AAA Replacement Parts Co.2 that the likelihood of confusion was
a mixed question of fact and law,' more recent decisions have
expressly rejected this view in favor of the proposition that
likelihood of confusion determinations are findings of fact.' At
least in infi-ingement actions, a trial court's resolution of the issue
is not to be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." As the former
" 451 F.2d 1254, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 780 (5th Cir. 1971).
'AId. at 1261, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 784. This holding subsequently was cited with
apparent approval in dictum in American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Heritage Life
Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 3, 15, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum).
" See, e.g., Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 840 n.16, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
10, 22 n.16 (11th Cir. 1983); Sun Banks v. Sun Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 314,
211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1981).
" For cases upholding district courts' determinations on this issue, see generally Bauer
Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1132-33 (11th Cir.
1991) (per curiam) (upholding finding of likelihood of confusion); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1531, 1545, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding finding of
likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Swatch Watch, S.A v. Taxor Inc.,
785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 392 (l1th Cir. 1986) (upholding finding of no
likelihood of confusion); Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1183, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 127 (11th Cir.) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1543,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1128-29 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding finding of likelihood of
confusion); Citibank, NA. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1547, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
292, 297 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding finding of likelihood of confusion); Jellibeans, Inc. v.
Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 846, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 22 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding
finding of likelihood of confusion); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,
973, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 522 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding finding of likelihood of
confusion); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding finding of likelihood of confusion); First
S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First S. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71,74,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
295, 297 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion); T.G.I. Fridays, Inc.
v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895,899,197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513,515 (5th
Cir. 1978) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.
v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 384, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 663 (5th Cir.
1977) (upholding finding of likelihood of confusion); Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Estee Lauder,
Inc., 533 F.2d 256, 257, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 471,471 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (upholding
finding of no likelihood of confusion); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 369-70 (5th Cir.)
(upholding finding of likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Penn Fishing
Tackle Mfg. Co. v. Pence, 505 F.2d 657,657-58,184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281,282 (5th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion); Hang Ten Int'l v. Sherry Mfg.
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Fifth Circuit has summarized this standard, "we reverse when the
result in a particular case does not reflect the truth and the right
Co., 498 F.2d 326, 327, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 141 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding finding of no
likelihood of confusion); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 445, 449,
178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 259 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion);
John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108,113,150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 728,731 (5th Cir.
1966) (upholding finding oflikelihood of confusion); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid Food
Prods., Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 469, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding
finding of no likelihood of confusion); Miami Credit Bureau Inc. v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 276
F.2d 565, 568, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1960) (upholding finding of likelihood of
confusion); Chappell v. Goltsman, 197 F.2d 837, 839, 94 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 42 (5th Cir.
1952) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion).
For cases overturning district courts' determinations of this issue, see generally Dieter v.
B & H Industries, 880 F.2d 322, 327, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1723 (11th Cir. 1989)
(overturning finding of no likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1164,216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599,
602 (11th Cir. 1982) (overturning finding of no likelihood of confusion); Sun Banks v. Sun
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 315, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1981)
(overturning finding of likelihood of confusion); Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d
500, 504, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1980) (overturning finding of no likelihood
of confusion); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
969, 974 (5th Cir.) (overturning finding of likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 502, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
19,24 (5th Cir.) (overturning finding of no likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932
(1979); Aladdin Indus. v. Alladin Lamp & Shade Corp., 556 F.2d 1263, 1265, 195 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 401, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1977) (overturning finding of no likelihood of confusion);
Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 3863 F.2d 945,949,150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312,
314 (5th Cir. 1966) (overturning finding of no likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1007 (1967); National Aas'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d
374, 376-77, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80, 81 (5th Cir. 1966) (overturning finding of no likelihood
of confusion).
Despite this professed deference to the trial court, it is perhaps worth noting that the court
has held in one case that an appellant may satisfy the "clearly erroneous" standard more
easily if the trial court has merely adopted findings of fact submitted by counsel for the
prevailing party. See Amstar, 615 F.2d at 258, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 974 ("[We can take
into account the District Court's lack of personal attention to factual findings in applying the
dearly erroneous rule.* (quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th Cir.
1979)). In another case, however, the court upheld the ultimate result coming from this
methodology, noting that "the scope of appellate review does not change simply because we
disapprove the manner in which the court arrived at its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. We are bound by the clearly erroneous rule in reference to factual determinations."
Professional Golfers Ass'n v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 672, 186 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1975). For commentary on this issue by the primary victims of the
court's disapproval of the practice, namely counsel for the unsuccessful appellee in Amstar,
see Julius R. Lunsford, Jr. & William R. Cohra, Trademark Protection: Judicial Inconsisten-
cy in the Fifth Circuit, 32 MERCER L REV. 1167, 1228-29 (1981).
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of the case.'
The standard is different, however, if the initial determination
was made by the federal Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").29
In Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co.,30 for
example, the appellant challenged the Assistant Commissioner of
Patents' finding that the appellant's marks were confusingly
similar to those of a prior federal registrant and therefore not
entitled to registration themselves. On the applicant's appeal from
this decision, which ultimately reached the former Fifth Circuit, the
court distinguished the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to
district court determinations, instead adopting a test first articulat-
ed by the D.C. Circuit: "In... trademark cases 'a finding of fact
by the Patent Office as to... confusing similarity of marks must
be accepted as controlling, unless the contrary is established by
evidence "which, in character and amount carries thorough
conviction."'" Despite this apparent deference, however, which
28 Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19,
24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979). See also Swatch Watch, S.A. v. Taxor Inc.,
785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 392 (11th Cir. 1986) (A district court's factual
finding is clearly erroneous when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.'" (quoting University of Ga. Athletic Asa'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1543,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1128 (11th Cir. 1985)).
' Under present law, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter "T.T.AB.* or
"Board'), a quasi-judicial panel within the PTO, typically undertakes likelihood of confusion
determination under two sets of circumstances. First, an applicant whose mark has been
denied federal registration by the PTO on the ground that it is confusingly similar to a prior
registered mark, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988), may appeal this finding to the Board in its
administrative appellate capacity. Second, the Board may act as a fact-finder in an inter
partes challenge to the mark's registrability brought by the prior registered mark's owner.
See id. §§ 1063-64. Prior to 1958, the Commissionor of Patents made these determinations.
See Pub. L No. 85-609, § l(a), 72 Stat. 540 (1958) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1067
(1988).
If dissatisfied with the initial registrability determination, parties to inter partea
proceedings and unsuccessful applicants may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (formerly the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals), 35 U.S.C.
§ 1071(a) (1988), or, alternatively, may elect to have their cases heard on a do novo basis by
a federal district court. See id. §§ 1071(b), 1121.
' 335 F.2d 72, 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (6th Cir. 1964).81 Id. at 74,142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 289 (quoting Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229
F.2d 37, 40, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161, 163 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 351 U.S. 973 (1956). See
also Coach House Restaurant v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1557, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (11th Cir. 1991) (reaffirming thorough-conviction standard of
review).
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stems from recognition of the PTO's "expertise" in the area,32 in
disputes between two parties later engaged in litigation before a
district court PTO determinations are not given res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect.' Should a district court accept the
Board's findings of fact, however, they then become subject to a
clearly erroneous standard of review."
I See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1974).
"As the court has justified this rule:
This Circuit has decided that Congress limited the res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to be given the decisions of the T"AB because
the Lanham Act provides for extensive judicial involvement in the
registration and protection of trademarks. Section 1071(b) of Title 15
U.S.C.A. (1982) empowers courts to hear appeals from the TTAB de novo.
... (Tihe ability of courts to hear appeals on a de novo basis reflects a
Congressional intent not to invoke the immunizing doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel with regard to TTAB proceedings. In this
Circuit, a court hearing an infringement claim is not legally and
conclusively bound by a prior decision of the TITAB regarding the same
trademark dispute.
Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1180,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 125 (11th
Cir.) (footnote and citation omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985). See also American
Heritage, 494 F.2d at 9-10, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 81 (extending "thorough conviction"
standard "to all findings made by the Patent Office in quasi-judicial, adversarial proceedings
between the same parties and emanating from the office's expertise).
On a somewhat related subject, the court has granted varying weight to state agencies'
determinations that a party using a particular name was entitled to do business within their
jurisdiction despite a prior user's use of an arguably similar name or mark. Compare Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 169, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 23 (5th
Cir.) (according great weight to approval of defendant's name by Texas State Board of
Insurance Commissioners), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957) with Seaboard Fin. Co. v.
Martin, 244 F.2d 329,331-32, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 362,364 (5th Cir. 1957) (declining to defer
to state's granting of corporate charter to defendant). See also Armstrong Cork Co. v. World
Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496,499,203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19,22 (5th Cir.) (addressing possibility
that defendant could be enjoined from use of name approved by Delaware Secretary of State),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979); cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540,
1545-46, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 296-97 (11th Cir. 1984) (declining to defer to Federal
Reserve Board's failure to object to defendant's use of infringing name).
" See, eg., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 445,447,178 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1973).
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II. FORMER FIFTH CIRcuIT AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APPLICATIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION ANALYSIS
Notwithstanding the apparently rigid doctrinal framework set
forth by the Roto-Rooter court, likelihood of confusion determina-
tions are not meant to be inflexible applications of that test.
Rather, as the court has noted of its multifactored analysis:
The issue of likelihood of confusion is not determined
by merely analyzing whether a majority of the
subsidiary factors indicates that such a likelihood
exists. Rather, a court must evaluate the weight to
be accorded the individual factors and then make its
ultimate decision. The appropriate weight to be
given to each of these factors varies with the circum-
stances of the case.'
Importantly, [t]he [trial] court does not have to consider all of
these factors in every case and in some cases, 'new' factors may
merit consideration.' This section examines the court's often
inconsistent treatment of the factors deemed important in varying
cases.
A. TYPE AND STRENGTH OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MARK
1. Type of Mark.
a. Word Marks. Consistent with virtually all other circuits,"7
the Eleventh Circuit classifies word marks into four general
categories:
3 AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166-67
(l1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
' Swatch Watch, S.A. v. Taxor, Inc., 785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 392
(11th Cir. 1986); see also University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1543, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1128 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to require trial court's express
consideration of each of relevant factors on ground that "[t]he real question is whether the
court's ultimate determination about the likelihood of confusion' was correct*).
'"See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753,2757,23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081, 1083 (1992) (describing classification of word marks into four categories of
generally increasing distinctiveness).
1994]
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[T]rademarks fall into four categories of strength: (1)
generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbi-
trary. "Generic" terms are those which name "the
genus or class of which an individual article or
service is but a member." "Descriptive" terms
"identify a characteristic or quality of an article or
service." "Suggestive" terms suggest characteristics
of the goods and services and "require an effort of the
imagination by the consumer in order to be under-
stood as descriptive." "Fanciful" or "arbitrary" terms
are words or phrases that bear no direct relationship
to the product. Generic terms represent the weaker
end of the spectrum, and arbitrary terms represent
the stronger.-
Applications of this framework are not always as straightforward
as its statement, however, as "[u]se of a word may fall within more
than one category; indeed, as a practical matter distinctions
between use in one category and use in another may be difficult to
make."'9 Once made, however, a district court's categorization of
Dieter v. B & H Indus., 880 F.2d 322, 327-28, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1725 (11th
Cir. 1989) (quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); see also
American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications & Television,
Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1548, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2085 (11th Cir. 1987); Freedom Say. &
Loan v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.5, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 127 n.5 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); University of Ga. Athletic As'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1540,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1126 (11th Cir. 1985); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d
833, 841 n.1S, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 22 n.15 (11th Cir. 1983); Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc.,
596 F.2d 111, 115, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016
(1980).
39Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1163, 216 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 599,601 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931
F.2d 1519, 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (Uth Cir.) ("The demarcation between
each category is more blurred than it is definite.), ert denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991);
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 282 (5th Cir.
1980) ('Although meant as pigeon-holes, these useful labels are instead central tones in a
spectrum; they tend to merge at their edges and are frequently difficult to apply."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115, 202 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[Tlhese categories ... are spectrum-like and tend to merge
imperceptibly from one to another.*), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
Obviously, classification of a mark becomes even more difficult if the associated goods or
services have evolved over time. See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,260
n.8, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 981 n.8 (5th Cir.) ("At one time, DOMINO as applied to
[Vol. 2:57
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a mark is regarded as a factual determination 3 and therefore
subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review.41
i. Generic Marks. In the Eleventh Circuit, as in all other
jurisdictions, "[a] generic term is typically incapable of achieving
[trademark or] service mark protection because it has no distinc-
tiveness."' 2 Consequently, "[a] generic term can never become a
trademark, [and] if a registered mark at any time becomes generic
with respect to a particular article, the Lanham Act provides for
the cancellation of that mark's registration."'"
plaintiffs sugar was descriptive, not arbitrary. There is evidence that, near the turn of the
century, plaintiff sold domino-shaped pieces of hard sugar in half bales."), cert denied, 449
U.S. 899 (1980).
,0 See Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1523, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (Tihe distinctive-
ness categorization given a term is a question of fact... .'); American Television, 810 F.2d
at 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2086 (existence of secondary meaning is question of fact).
41 See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
As with likelihood of confusion determinations, see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text, the court is apparently willing to defer to the PTO's determination that a mark falls
within a particular category of distinctiveness. Significantly, however, the court will not
exercise such deference in the absence of an affirmative finding by the PTO. See generally
Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1524, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059 ("Although we will bestow
proper respect to the determinations of the PIO, we will not defer to an ethereal
determination that is not affirmatively stated by the administrative agency.").
'2 Investacorp at 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
For other statements to similar effect, see Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach & Six
Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1560, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 131 (11th Cir. 1991);
Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.5, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401,
1405 n.5 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); Sun Banks v. Sun Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311,315,211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844,848 (5th Cir. 1981); Vision Ctr. v. Opticks,
Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1016 (1980).
," Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 283 (5th
Cir. 1980) (citation and footnote omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981). As the court has
noted of the rationale underlying the rule against allowing parties to acquire protectable
rights to generic terms:
The obvious reason for giving less protection to generic terms in a...
mark... is that to de otherwise would place an unreasonable burden on
third parties. To exclude other providers of a good or service from the
right to use generic terms once they have been appropriated by a
provider of the good [or service], would quickly result in a situation in
which businesses were struggling to convey information about their
business in their mark but without using any words that described their
business, because those words would already be protected in the ...
mark of another firm. In such a world, there would be almost no
possibility of confusing one ... mark with another. Unfortunately the
17
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Despite these strong statements, however, a relative dearth of
cases in which genericness was at issue" hampers an examination
of Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence concerning generic marks.
Although the court has not expressly defined in an actual holding
what constitutes a generic mark,' its decisions routinely note that
"generic terms ... communicate 'information about the nature or
class of an article or service.'"'s Likewise, a generic term may
also be "the name of a particular genus or class of which an
individual article or service is but a member." 7
One case in which the court did have an opportunity to provide
guidance on the issue was Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.," which
involved the plaintiffs attempt to protect its federally registered
LARVACIDE mark; a mark used in connection with "fumigants for
public would also be receiving very little information about the nature of
a business' service from its mark.
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 841 n.19, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 22 n.19
(11th Cir. 1983).
" In Citibank, N.A. v. Citibane Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 292
(11th Cir. 1984), for example, the court, without extended discussion, affirmed the district
courts conclusion that the plaintiffs CITIBANC mark for banking services was not generic.
See id. at 1545, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 296.
' For cases in which the court has offered examples, in dictum, of marks it considers to
be generic, see Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investment Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519,1522,
19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (11th Cir.) (The term Milk Delivery' is an example of a
generic service mark for a hypothetical milk delivery service.*), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639
(1991); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,283 (5th
Cir. 1980) (noting that "'ivory' is generic of elephant tusks*), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981).
" Sun Banks v. Sun Fed. Say. & Loan As'n, 651 F.2d 311,315,211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844,
848 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 11, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also Coach House Restaurant,
Inc. v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1560,19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401,1405
(11th Cir. 1991) ("A term which suggests the basic nature of the service is generic ... .');
Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 ("A term which suggests the
basic nature of the service is generic.); American Television & Communications Corp. v.
American Communications & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546,1548,1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084,
2086 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A generic name suggests the basic nature of the article or service.).
,7 Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115,202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 338 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980); see also Freedom Say. & Loan As'n v. Way, 757
F.2d 1176, 1182 n.5, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 131 n.5 (11th Cir.) (concluding that generic
marks "refer to a particular genus or class of which an individual service is but a member'),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
4" 617 F.2d 1178, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981).
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exterminating bugs, insects, slugs, and rodents.' The subjects
of the plaintiffs ire were competing products sold as "SHELL
Poultry Spray & Larvicide" and "RABON Oral Larvicide," the
former covering "[a] liquid ordinarily used in spray form [and]
either sprayed directly on birds to control mites and lice or sprayed
on poultry droppings to inhibit the growth of larvae and maggots"
and the latter a preparation "added to cattle feed to control fly
larvae in manure.'w At trial, a jury found the word "larvicide" to
be "the common descriptive name for an agent or substance for
killing larvae."51 On the basis of this finding, the district court
found the plaintiffs mark to be generic and ordered the cancella-
tion of the mark's federal registration.'
On the plaintiff's appeal, however, the former Fifth Circuit
reversed. Although it was true that the term "larvicide" might well
be the generic name for a preparation intended to combat the
spread of larvae, as indeed the jury had found it to be, a finding
that the defendant was using the term in a generic sense did not
necessarily translate into a finding that the mark was generic with
respect to the plaintiffs products. Rather, the appellate court
noted, "plaintiff used its mark on products that are intended to kill
many forms of animal life, not merely larvae.' Concluding that
the plaintiffs mark therefore fell outside the proper definition of
"generic," the court thus held it eligible for protection.5"
ii. Descriptive Marks. "Descriptive" terms identify character-
istics or qualities of the goods or services with which they are
connected, such as color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredi-
ents.' They also include the personal names of providers of the
'9 See id. at 1181, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 281.
5I ld. at 1182, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 282.
' Quoted in id. at 1186, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 285.
52Id., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 285.
" Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1190, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 289 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
" In finding that the mark was, in fact, descriptive rather than generic, however, the
appellate court found that the defendant was entitled to use the term in its purely
descriptive sense. See id. For more on the so-called "fair use defense," see infra notes 197-
206 and accompanying text.
S oweco, 617 F.2d at 1183, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 283; see also Investacorp, Inc. v.
Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711
F.2d 966, 974, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 522 (11th Cir. 1983).
1994]
19
Davis: Likelihood of Confusion Determinations: A Survey of Eleventh Circ
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 2:57
relevant goods or services," as well as geographic terms corre-
sponding to their physical origin." These types of marks are far
from uncommon; rather, as the court has noted, "[aipparently
entrepreneurs can not resist the temptation to tie the name of their
product to some... quality of description, geography, or vanity.'
If an allegedly descriptive mark is not composed of a personal
name or geographical designation, the issue of whether it is
properly considered descriptive may be resolved through an
application of one of several tests. On one level, a court may
simply refer to the "plain dictionary definition" of a mark to
determine "the idea conveyed to the observer" by the mark."
Thus, for example, in Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investment
Banking Corp., the court concluded that "the two formatives
combined in the term 'Investacorp' literally convey to the observer
that [the plaintiffi is in the business of investing in corpora-
tions.' °  Therefore, "[b]ecause the customer who observes the
term can readily perceive the nature of plaintiff's services, without
having to exercise his imagination,... 'Investacorp' must be merely
" Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058; see also Conagra, Inc.
v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1513, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 556 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding
SINGLETON name had acquired secondary meaning as designation of business of
SINGLETON PACKAGING).
'" See, e.g., Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860-62,
153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1967); Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental Fire Ass'n,
101 F. 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1900) (both holding CONTINENTAL mark to be descriptive).
The court has, however, acknowledged that [t]here are certain words, which while
containing the germ of geographic significance, cannot be identified with any specific
geographic unit or are not used in a descriptive sense .... * World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick
Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 486, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609, 612 (5th Cir.
1971). This acknowledgement notwithstanding, at least one Eleventh Circuit jurist has
expressed a willingness to hold certain geographic terms generic, and hence unprotectable
under any circumstances. See Citibank, NA. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1550
n.6, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 300 n.6 (11th Cir. 1984) (Vance, J., dissenting).
' Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 848, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 37, 40
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
" Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519,1523-24,19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1056, 1059 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991).
Note, however, that the court has noted on at least one occasion that "the absence of a
word or expression from dictionaries is not controlling on the question of [descriptiveness].'a
Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 117 n.17, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 342 n.17 (5th
Cir. 1979) (quoting In re Cooper, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 186 (T.TA.B. 1977), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1016 (1980)).
60 931 F.2d at 1524, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
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descriptive."61
Dictionary definitions notwithstanding, "'whether competitors
would be likely to need the terms used in the [mark]'" is also
probative of the degree to which that designation is merely
descriptive of the associated goods or services.' Thus, the Investa-
corp court bolstered its etymological arguments as to the meaning
of the putative INVESTACORP mark by noting that "[bloth of the
two formatives 'invest' and 'corp' pervade the lexicon of business
terminology. Because the two formatives are indispensable to the
investment services industry, we agree that it is very likely that
competitors will need to use these terms.' Likewise, another
panel of the former Fifth Circuit held the term "Vision Center" to
be merely descriptive after finding that "the word 'vision' is
virtually indispensable... to the optical goods industry... [and]
naturally occurs to one in thinking of the goods and services
provided by the parties. Similarly, the word 'center' is a common
term found useful by a variety of commercial enterprises."
Finally, consistent with the preceding factor, a court evaluating
the descriptiveness of a particular mark may also refer to industry
usage as a gauge.' Thus, the Investacorp court found the "ex-
treme" popularity of use within the industry probative of the
descriptiveness of the primary component of the plaintiff's mark."
Likewise, in American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Heritage Life
Insurance Co.,"" the court upheld the trial court's determination
61 Id.
a Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 116, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 338 (quoting Union Carbide Corp.
v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623, 635 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976)).
3 931 F.2d at 1523, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 105849.
Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 116, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 339.
Although very similar, this factor differs from the one previously discussed in a critical
respect. The descriptiveness decisions addressed at supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text stand for the proposition that a mark is descriptive if its nature makes it competitively
necessary for industry members to use, whether or not they actually do. In contrast, the
industry-usage factor holds that a mark's descriptive nature may be discerned by amining
how industry participants use it.
As set forth in greater detail at infra notes 187-236 and accompanying text, evidence of
third party usage also is relevant for determining a mark's 'strength," or scope of protection.
Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519,1523,19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1056, 1059 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991).
6 494 F.2d 3, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77 (5th Cir. 1974).
1994]
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that the salient portion of the plaintiffs mark was descriptive by
noting that "[tihe industry itself evidently recognizes the truth of
the district court's finding because the word ... is used in the
corporate names of insurance companies all over the country.'
Under applications of these tests, marks held by the court to be
merely descriptive of their goods or services include:
MARK GOODS OR SERVICES
AFTER TAN
AMERICAN TELEVISION
AND COMMUNICATIONS
ALO
BAVARIAN
CONFESSIONS
CREAMETTE
DAY-BRITE
DRY-ICE
HERITAGE
post-tanning skin lotion"
television communication
services7"
skin care products containing
aloe vera gel71
beer 72
pulp magazine
73
frozen dessert product7'
lighting equipment75
solid carbon dioxide
76
life insurance services
77
6 Id. at 11, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82.
oAloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 533 F.2d 256, 257-58,195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
471, 471 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
" American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications &
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987).
" Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 848, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 37, 38
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
" International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 364 F.2d 261, 262-263, 150
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1966).
" Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Bronze Publications, Inc., 173 F.2d 778, 779, 81 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 175, 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 869 (1949).
14 Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108, 111-12, 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160, 162 (5th Cir.
1951) (applying Florida law), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
"' Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sta-Brite Fluorescent Mfg. Co., 308 F.2d 377, 382, 135
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
" DryIce Corp. v. Louisiana Dry Ice Corp., 4 F.2d 882, 884-86 (5th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 286 U.S. 558 (1932).
American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11, 182 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1974). But see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAiR COMPETrIoN, § 11.08, at 11-34 n.33 (3d ed. 1992) (describing holding in
American Heritage as 'dubious characterization").
[Vol. 2:57
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INVESTACORP investment consulting
services 7
PERSONAL LOANS, INC. small loan services7 '
POST-DISPATCH newspaper s°
SNAP ginger ale8 l
VISION CENTER clinic providing optical products
and services 2
WHITE KITCHEN restaurant services'
If a word mark is found to be descriptive, it is protectable only if
its owner is able to demonstrate that the mark has acquired a
"secondary" meaning." Although the concept defies easy defini-
tion, "[t]he secondary meaning doctrine... holds that words which
have a primary [descriptive] meaning of their own... may by long
use in connection with a particular product, come to be known by
the public as specifically designating that product."" To establish
secondary meaning in the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff" 'must
" Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523-24,19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991).
" Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Allenstein, 173 F.2d 38, 40,80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537,539
(5th Cir. 1949).
80 Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Houston Printing Co., 11 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 273 U.S. 694 (1926).
"1 W.T. Wagner's Sons Co. v. Orange Snap Co., 18 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1927).
8 Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 116, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
'sFaciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732, 737, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 395-96 (5th Cir. 1956).
Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.5, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611,
613 n.5 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
' Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474,477,181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
611, 613 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, 423 F.2d 845, 165
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970):
Considered today as a part of the broader law of unfair competition, the
doctrine of secondary meaning is another avenue to protection of trade
names independent of any trademark act. The doctrine has been
accounted as the response of the common law to the realities of business
life. Apparently entrepreneurs can not resist the temptation to tie the
name of their product to some disabling quality of description, geography,
or vanity. While this foible [normally] prevents recourse to the Act, in
a proper case the law will recognize the years of effort and expense,
necessary to effect a turn of the public mind, with equivalent protection.
Once secondary meaning is established, the beneficiary need only show
a likelihood of confusion to enjoin an infringing use.
Id. at 848, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
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show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer."'" Need-
less to say, the more descriptive the plaintiffs mark, the more
burdensome a demonstration of this association becomes.87  As
with the likelihood of confusion determination itself, whether
secondary meaning exists is an issue of fact.'
Assuming that a defendant does not admit it exists,"M a mark's
secondary meaning generally is demonstrated through two
mechanisms, the first of which is established by the Lanham Act
itself. If a plaintiff has federally registered its mark, section 33(a)
of the Act" provides that the registration constitutes "prima fade"
evidence of the mark's validity, including its distinctiveness as an
indicator of origin." If the registration is more than five years
' Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 118, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 340 (5th Cir.
1979) (quoting Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1016 (1980); accord American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d
3, 12, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications &
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A
high degree of proof is necessary to establish secondary meaning for a descriptive term which
suggests the basic nature of the product or service."); American Heritage, 494 F.2d at 12, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 83 ( r]he evidentiary burden necessary to establish secondary meaning
is substantial" for descriptive marks); see also Milsan, 423 F.2d at 850, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 41 ("We agree... that the evidentiary burden, necessary to establish secondary meaning,
is substantial where the mark applied to an article designates a principal ingredient desired
by the public.*).
'American Television, 810 F.2d at 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2086; Aloe Creme Labs.,
Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 533 F.2d 256, 257-58, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 471, 471 (th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477-78, 181
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611, 613-14 (th Cir. 1974).
"In cases in which the defendant has admitted that the plaintiffs descriptive mark has
acquired secondary meaning, the court need not examine the accuracy of this admission. See
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sta-Brite Fluorescent Mfg. Co., 308 F.2d 377, 382, 135 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1962) (accepting defendant's concession of secondary meaning as
dispositive of issue).
go 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988); see also id. § 1057(b) (*A certificate of registration of a mark
upon the principal register provided by this [Act] shall be prima facie evidence of the validity
of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrants ownership of
the mark, and of the registrants exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce
,
1 See generally American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10,
182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1974):
Under [section 33(a)], registration is prima facie evidence of the
registrant's ownership of the mark and of the registrants exclusive right
to use the mark in commerce in connection with the (goods or] services
24
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old, this presumption can become "conclusive," provided that the
registrant complies with certain procedural formalities. 2 Accord-
ingly, the owner of a registered descriptive mark proceeding under
either section 32"8 or section 43(a)" need not demonstrate sec-
ondary meaning as part of its prima facie case."
In the absence of a federal registration of the plaintiff's mark, the
standards for determining whether secondary meaning exists in an
action under section 43(a)96 to protect an unregistered mark are
largely judicial creations. Characteristic with its other decisions in
the area, the Eleventh Circuit has set forth a multifactored test to
be used when determining whether a particular unregistered mark
has achieved secondary meaning:
The factors to consider.., are: (1) the length and
manner of its use; (2) the nature and extent of
advertising and promotion; (3) the efforts made by
the plaintiff to promote a conscious connection in the
specified in the registration certificate. Thus registration is sufficient to
establish prima facie (1) the required prior use (2) of registrable mark (3)
which is likely to be confused with another's use of the same or similar
mark.
Id., 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82 (citations omitted).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (1988); see also Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d
1178,1190,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,289 (5th Cir. 1980) (presuming secondary meaning from
mark's statutory status), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Rote-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 613
F.2d 44,46, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) (same). The primary requirement for
conclusive evidentiary status is the registrant's filing of an affidavit averring that the
underlying mark has been in continuous use since its registration and that there has been
no final judicial decision adverse to the registrants ownership of the mark. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1065 (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
"Id. § 1125(a).
"See, eg., Roto-Rooter, 513 F.2d at 46, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 74 (holding that trial court
incorrectly required federal registrant to demonstrate secondary meaning). Obviously, as
with all presumptions, the statutory presumption may be overcome upon an appropriate
showing by the defendant, provided that the plaintiff's registration has not become
incontestable within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1065. See, eg., Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc.,
596 F.2d 111, 119-20, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1979) (establishing
descriptive nature of mark will rebut presumption), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
Moreover, even if this presumption of distinctiveness has, in fact, become conclusive, a
defendant still may rely upon the narrowly drawn defenses set forth in section 33(bX1)-(8)
of the Act, including but not limited to the fair use defense applicable to descriptive marks
generally. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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public's mind between the name and the plaintiffs
product or business; and (4) the extent to which the
public actually identifies the name with the plain-
tiffs product or venture.'
In addition to these factors, at least one panel of the court has held
that a defendant's intentional copying constitutes probative-but
not conclusive-evidence of secondary meaning."
Obviously, an application of the second and third enumerated
factors mandates that a descriptive mark's owner not only use the
mark in her advertising but that she draw attention to it as
well." Thus, a plaintiff may not prove secondary meaning by
demonstrating extensive advertising of an acronym comprised of
the first letters of the words making up her mark." Likewise,
she also may not single out a descriptive word from a larger mark
for protection without demonstrating that she has drawn consumer
attention to that word, separately and independently of the mark
as a whole.0 1
7 Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508,1513,224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552,555 (11th Cir.
1984); see also American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications
& Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987)
(applying Conagra factors to determine secondary meaning); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
schaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 478, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying
first three factors to determine secondary meaning).
" See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 860, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
536, 540 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Although we believe that proof of intentional copying is probative
evidence on the secondary meaning issue, we cannot agree with (plaintiff] that proof of
intentional copying conclusively establishes that the plaintiffs trademark or trade dress has
acquired secondary meaning.*); cf. CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d
1007, 1012, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 499-500 (Fed Cir. 1985) (concluding, in application of
Eleventh Circuit law, that [elvidence of deliberate imitation and copying in this case also
supports a determination of secondary meaning").
9 See Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 860, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540 (requiring substantial
"image advertising" focusing on plaintiffs alleged mark).
o American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications &
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987).
'0' American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 12-13, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Of these factors, it is the last that the court is most likely to
consider dispositive. 1°2 In Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Mil-
san, Inc.,"° for example, the plaintiff, although conceding that its
use of ALO was descriptive of the aloe vera content of its goods,
nevertheless maintained that the term had achieved secondary
meaning. In support of this claim, the plaintiff alleged that it had
spent "almost $3,000,000 in an effort to place the word 'Alo' on the
lips of every prospective female customer in the American market,"
that it had achieved a "nationwide market," and that the "value
and quality" of its products had been widely recognized by indepen-
dent writers in newspaper and magazine articles. °' Despite
these relatively impressive efforts, however, the former Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that no secondary
meaning existed, concluding, "[i]n considering this evidence, it must
be remembered that the question is not the extent of the promotion-
al efforts, but their effectiveness in altering the meaning of 'Alo' to
the consuming public. " "°a
In contrast, however, the court relied on the critical fourth factor
in ConAgra, Inc. v. Singleton °" to hold that secondary meaning
had in fact been achieved. Although impressed with the plaintiff's
expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars on advertising
annually, the court found "most telling" market surveys revealing
that the plaintiff's mark was strongly identified with the plaintiff's
products.'" On the basis of this widespread awareness, which
extended through food brokers as well as the public generally, the
appellate court found the district court's finding that no secondary
meaning existed to be clearly erroneous.108
'Indeed, at least one panel of the former Fifth Circuit was willing to collapse the
secondary meaning analysis into an application of this single factor: "The test of secondary
meaning is the effectiveness of the effort to create it, and the chief inquiry is directed toward
the consumer's attitude about the mark in question: does it denote to him or her 'a single
thing coming from a single source?'" Amearin Heritage, 494 F.2d at 12, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 83 (quoting Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802,167 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1970)).
423 F.2d 845, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 37 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
Id. at 850, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 41.
Id., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 41.
z" 743 F.2d 1508, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552 (11th Cir. 1984).
'07 Id. at 1513-14, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 555-56.
"s Id. at 1514, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 556.
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iii. Suggestive Marks. According to the Eleventh Circuit,
"[a] suggestive term suggests, rather than describes, a characteris-
tic of the goods or services and requires an effort of the imagination
by the consumer in order to be understood as descriptive .... ."',
In contrast to descriptive marks, suggestive marks are considered
inherently distinctive and their owners therefore have no need to
acquire distinctiveness through long-term usage and promotion.1 0
Although suggestive marks may consist of single words,' they
may also be nothing more than combinations of otherwise purely
descriptive words. 12  In Citibank, NA. v. Citibanc Group,
Inc.,"3 for example, the defendant user of the CITIBANC mark
sought to defend an infringement suit brought by a prior user of
the CITIBANK mark by arguing that its own mark was descriptive
and therefore presumably eligible for the "fair use" defense.11 '
Affirming the district court, however, the Eleventh Circuit held
that "W[the term 'Citi' does not describe a class of banking services
or a characteristic of banking services. As the district court stated,
'[tihe most that can be said for City Bank is that it suggests a
modern or urban bank.' "15 Under these circumstances, the
appellate court held, "we find that Citibank indicates not a type of
service, but a provider of that service."1 '
10 American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications &
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987).
11 Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1522, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1056, 1058 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991); see also Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1165 n.9, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 603 n.9
(11th Cir. 1982) ('Once a mark is shown at least to have a suggestive quality, secondary
meaning need not be shown.').
" See, e.g., Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,
283-84 (5th Cir. 1980) ('If used as a trademark for refrigerators, the term 'Penguin' would
be suggestive.'), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
l See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 116, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 338 (5th
Cir. 1979) ('We are, of course, aware that common, ordinary words can be combined in a
novel or unique way and thereby achieve a degree of protection denied to the words when
used separately.*), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
' ' 724 F.2d 1540, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292 (11th Cir. 1984).
On the fair use defense, see infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
'
1 Citibank, N.A, 724 F.2d at 1545, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 296 (citation omitted) (second
bracket in original).
1- Id., 222 U.S.P.Q. at 296.
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The court reached a similar result in Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,' 7 in which it undertook to catego-
rize the plaintiffs mark after the district court's failure to do so.
Although acknowledging that "[o]ther than in its use as a mark, the
word Safeway does indeed have no meaning," the court neverthe-
less declined to hold the mark a "coined," or fanciful one. 1 Rath-
er, the court held in analyzing a mark it characterized as "merely
... a combination of two other common words," "[a]lthough not
descriptive of the retail grocery services [plaintiff] provides, the
word is suggestive of the reliability of the services."1 9
iv. Arbitrary and Coined Marks. At the opposite end of the
spectrum from generic marks are those found to be "arbitrary" or
"coined." According to the court, an arbitrary mark "'is a word in
common use, but applied to a product or service unrelated to its
meaning, so that the word neither describes nor suggests the
product or service.' "120 Like suggestive marks, arbitrary marks
are protectable, and may be federally registered, without a showing
of secondary meaning.1
21
In contrast, coined marks are "purely fanciful" words with no
apparent meaning.122 Although the court in Exxon Corp. v. Texas
Motor Exchange, Inc.' passed up an obvious opportunity to deem
the plaintiffs trademark a coined or fanciful mark, instead merely
categorizing it as "strong,"'2 other panels of the court have
117 675 F.2d 1160, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599 (11th Cir. 1982).
", Id. at 1164, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 602.
11 Id. at 1164-65, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 602-603.
'u Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 841 n.18, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 17
n.18 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 611
n.2, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 568 n.2 (7th Cir. 1965)).
'2' American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communications &
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1987);
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,283-84 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
= Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,260,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969,976
(5th Cir.) (DOMINO mark for pizza is arbitrary but not fanciful), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899,
208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (1980).
' 628 F.2d 500, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384 (th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 504, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 387. For another missed opportunity to designate
an apparently coined term as such, see Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Stevens, 15 F.2d 312,
313 (5th Cir. 1926) (categorizing HY-TEX mark as "arbitrary").
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tendered such examples of coined marks as ESSO,1  SOHIO,1"
KODAK,' and XEROX, 12 as well as the unquestionably fanci-
ful BARNBARNFISH," offered by one panel "strictly for peda-
gogical reasons."" Like arbitrary marks, coined and fanciful
marks are considered inherently distinctive and therefore entitled
to protection without a showing of secondary meaning."'
b. Design Marks and Trade Dresses. Although the majority of
infringement cases, in the Eleventh Circuit and elsewhere, involve
allegations of infringement of marks comprised of a word or series
of words, designations of origin need not consist simply of words to
qualify for protection. On the contrary, the court has long recog-
nized the possibility of extending protection to marks comprised of
non-verbal components, such as stylized animal figures" and
sports-team emblems." Such designations of origin fall within
the category of "design" marks, as opposed to their "word" mark
counterparts.
Moreover, protection is available under certain circumstances
even for the so-called "trade dress" associated with a particular
product or service. Although the increasingly broad concept of
trade dress does not lend itself to succinct definition, trade dress
' Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 363 F.2d 945, 950, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
312, 316 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
Id., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 316.
See Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178,1184,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278,283-84
(5th Cir. 1980) (using KODAK as example of arbitrary term), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,260,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969,976
(5th Cir.) (comparing KODAK to DOMINO in finding that latter is not arbitrary), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
'"
8Soweco, 617 F.2d at 1184,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 283-84; Ametar, 615 F.2d at 260,205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 976.
' Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1056, 1058-59 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 639 (1991).
uo Id. at 1522 n.14, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 n.14.
n' Id. at 1523, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
n See University of Ga. Athletic As'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1540,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1122, 1126 (11th Cir. 1985) (protecting stylized English bulldog as mark design); of Squirrel
Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840, 844, 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296, 298 (5th Cir.
1955) (examining whether defendant's use of design mark likely to cause confusion with
plaintiffs word mark), cerL denied, 350 U.S. 995 (1956).
' See Boston Professional Hockey Asa'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1008, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 366 (6th Cir.) (protecting team emblems from
infringement), ert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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generally is the overall image used to present a product or service
to purchasers.1"' In its most common form, trade dress consists
of the particular packaging and labels associated with a particular
product." It can also, however, include such characteristics as
size, shape, and color."" In less common situations, cognizable
trade dress can even consist of the physical appearance of buildings
associated with a plaintiff's services... or a plaintiff's unique sales
techniques.ca
As is the case with purely verbal word marks, a plaintiff seeking
to protect its design mark or trade dress must demonstrate that the
defendant has used a corresponding indicator of origin that is likely
to cause confusion. 13 Unlike word mark owners, however,
owners of design marks and trade dresses bear the burden of proof
on two other issues. First, they must demonstrate that their marks
' See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 515, 528 (11th Cir. 1983) (protecting appearance of bank checks).
' Trihe majority of trade dress claims involve a manufacturer's container or packaging
for a product.' Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Lof, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 753-54 (11th Cir. 1982).
For representative cases addressing the protectability of container appearances, see
AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.
1986) (foil wrapper for frozen ice cream bar), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Sun-Fun
Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186,190,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91,94-95
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (exterior of suntan lotion bottle).
I See, eg., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165,1170,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128,
1131 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (configuration of electric lamp); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v.
Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 36, 538 (11th Cir. 1983) (V.
shaped design affixed to side of running shoe); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 980, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 528 (11th Cir. 1983) (appearance of bank
checks); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188,
203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1979) (appearance of cheerleaders' uniforms);
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 388, 193
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 667 (5th Cir. 1977) (design of chicken cartons and napkins); Alum-A-
Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556, 557, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68, 69
(5th Cir. 1971) (configuration of aluminum shutters).
See, e.g., T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895,
899, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1978) (addressing protectability of restaurant
appearance); McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435, 435, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 488, 489
(5th Cir. 1966) (same).
' See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 753-54 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding -adoption' procedures associated with
plaintiffs dolls protectable as trade dress).
' See, eg., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1170,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128,
1131 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (upholding finding of confusing similarity in product
configuration context).
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or trade dresses are not "functional." Second, they must establish
that the design mark or trade dress is either inherently distinctive
or, alternatively, has acquired secondary meaning."O The re-
mainder of this section examines the showings sufficient to satisfy
these standards.
i. Functionality. The principle that functional designs are
not protectable under unfair competition law corresponds generally
to the principle precluding protection of generic designations as
word marks.14' As a general rule, federal law encourages the
widespread use of designs that are necessary for industry partici-
pants to compete effectively in the marketplace."4  In cases
involving such designs, the appropriate mechanism for protecting
them lies in the realm of patent, rather than trademark, law and,
in the absence of a utility patent, "[olutright copying is often a
civilizing rather than a cannibalizing folkway."" Thus, if a
particular feature of a plaintiff's design is functional, no amount of
secondary meaning or consumer confusion will render it protect-
able.1"
Nevertheless, although the court expressly has held that the
distinction between "civilizing" and "cannibalizing" conduct is a
question of fact," guidelines on how to draw that distinction are
far less clear. On the most basic level, the court's decisions reflect
uncertainty whether differing tests for functionality apply to trade
dress consisting of packaging for, or superfluous ornamentation
attached to, a plaintiff's goods, on the one hand, and the configura-
tion or shape of the products, on the other. For example, in Brooks
- See, eg., id., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1131; ee also AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d
1531, 1535, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 1986) (foil wrapper for ice cream bar),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 857, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538
(V-shaped design on running shoe); John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 980, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 528 (appearance of bank checks).
14 See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
142 See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 515, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying protection to widely used check-stub design).
14 B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1259, 171 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 780,783 (5th Cir. 1971), cited with approval in John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 982,
219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 529.
'" See, eg., J.R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313, 320, 104 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 224, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1955) (denying protection to functional ironing table configura-
tion).
" John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 982,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 529.
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Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp.,'" a case involving
an ornamental design affixed to the parties' shoes, the court held
that "to prevail on a trade dress infringement claim a plaintiff must
prove.., that features of... its trade dress are primarily nonfunc-
tional .... 147 The court has adopted a similar standard for
product packaging and containers,'" suggesting that plaintiffs
will be able to protect the overall appearance of this type of trade
dress even if particular components are functional.14'
In contrast, however, the court's trade dress cases in the product
configuration context have suggested--albeit without extended
analysis-that a different standard applies to plaintiffs' efforts to
protect their products. Specifically, in Bauer Lamp Co. v.
Shaffer,"s the court upheld a successful challenge to the defen-
dant's copying of the plaintiff's lamps. In doing so, however, the
court offered a subtly different assessment of the plaintiff's burden
on this issue, holding that "to establish trade dress infringement
the plaintiff must show.., that the ... features in question are
nonfunctional."1 l Bauer Lamp and other decisions adopting a
similar analysis 152 suggest that the court may be moving toward
the position taken by a growing number of jurisdictions, namely,
that a product configuration owner may protect only those individu-
14 716 F.2d 854, 857, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 538 (lth Cir. 1983).
17 Id., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538.
148AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
149 See, eg., id. at 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 ('That individual elements of
packaging are functional does not, however, render the package as a whole unprotectible."
(footnote omitted)). Perhaps significantly, however, even the AmBrit court held that the
plaintiff in that case was entitled to protect only the purely nonfunctional ornamentation
affixed to its foil wrapper. With respect to the remaining elements of the packaging, "Kraft
was.. free to imitate those features of the KLONDIKE packaging with complete impunity.'
Id. at 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
941 F.2d 1165, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
I1 d. at 1170, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131 (emphasis added).
For other opinions by the court in the product configuration context that arguably
require the plaintiff to demonstrate the nonfunctional nature of individual features making
up a product's shape instead of trade dress as a whole, see Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Cycles USA,
Inc., 765 F.2d 1502, 1609, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 879, 880 (11th Cir. 1985) (adopting district
court opinion), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 528 (11th Cir. 1983).
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al features of its design that are demonstrably nonfunctional.1"
Under this rule, a plaintiff seeking to protect an entire configura-
tion presumably would need to do more than prove the existence of
some nonfunctional elements or, alternatively, that the overall
configuration is nonfunctional. Rather, such a plaintiff would bear
the burden of demonstrating that its entire design is nonfunction-
al.164
Whether differing degrees of nonfunctionality must be proved for
packaging and product configurations, the court has not provided
a clear definition of "functional" in either context. In perhaps what
would have been its best opportunity to address the issue in a suit
to protect a product's design John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc.,15 the court dodged the issue. Although ultimately approv-
ing of the trial court's jury instruction, namely, that "[in evaluat-
ing this issue, you must keep in mind that even though an object
may serve some practical purposes, its design is protectable as
trade dress if... the design in primarily nonfunctional," the court
acknowledged that "[the defendant] makes a strong argument that
the jury was inadequately instructed on the issue of functional-
ity."1 ' To the extent that the court has provided any clear
guidance on how to determine the functionality of product configu-
rations, it has suggested that a finding of functionality is appropri-
ate if the design is necessary to conform to industry standards,'57
if the plaintiff has touted the functional aspects of its design in its
'n At least one district court in the Eleventh Circuit has adopted this reading of Bauer
Lamp. See Gale Group Inc. v. King City Indus. Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208,1212 (M.D.
Fla. 1992) (Under Bauer, to establish trade dress infringement Plaintiff ... must show that
... the features allegedly copied are non-functional .... a)-
1 For examples of such a rule, see generally Clamp Manufacturing Co. v. Enco
Manufacturing Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.) (-For an
overall product configuration to be recognized as a trademark, the entire design must be
nonfunctional.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Textron, Inc. v.
International Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019,1025,224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 625,628-29 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (same); Ohio Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870, 884-85, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1507 (N.D. Il. 1992) (holding that one functional feature threatens
federal registration of entire configuration); Tenax Corp. v. Tensar Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1881,1889 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that overall product design must be nonfunctional).
711 F.2d 966, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 982 n.27, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530 n.27.
1 7 See id. at 983 n.30, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 531 n.30 (denying protection to check stub
used throughout banking industry).
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advertising,"5 or if the feature sought to be protected is "a result
of a well known manufacturing process."15
As in the product configuration context, the court primarily has
addressed the functionality of product packaging in its role as an
appellate tribunal reviewing district courts' ultimate determina-
tions of infringement or noninfringement, rather than as an arbiter
of standards. In AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,i s° for example, the
plaintiff sought to protect the containers for its frozen ice cream
bars in the face of the defendant's claim that the packaging was
wholly functional. Lacking guidance from its own court of appeals,
the district court for the Middle District of Florida turned to case
law from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to hold that:
In determining whether [a] trade dress is primarily
non-functional, the test is whether upholding an
exclusive right to use the trade dress as a whole
would hinder effective competition by others. Fac-
tors to be taken into account are whether a particu-
lar design is superior, whether there are alternative
trade dress configurations available, and whether a
particular design is comparatively simple or
cheap. 16 1
On the defendant's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's determination that although the plaintiffs use of a plastic
tray with a foil overlap was functional, the appearance of the foil
See id. at 983 n.28, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 531 n.28 (considering advertising stressing
ease with which plaintiff's product could be transported probative of functionality).
SJ.R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313, 320, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224,
229-30 (5th Cir. 1955).
160 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
161 saly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983,991,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 806 (M.D. Fla.
1985) (citingln re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339-41,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
9, 14-15 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014, 177
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 206 (C.C.P.A. 1973), affd sub nom. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d
1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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overlap was not.162 Other than agreeing that enjoining the defen-
dant from use of the tray configuration "would hinder [the defen-
dant] in its attempt to compete effectively," however, the appellate
court did not comment on the district court's applied test.1"
Thus, whether the language from the district court's opinion quoted
above constitutes the proper test in the Circuit remains unre-
solved.16
ii. Distinctiveness. Assuming that the owner of a non-verbal
designation of origin is able to satisfy the nonfunctionality require-
ment, it must then demonstrate that its putative design mark or
trade dress is distinctive. As with word marks, there are two
primary avenues to achieving this purpose.
1 As the district court noted of these elements of the plaintiffs claimed trade dress:
Some of the features of the [plaintiffs] bar's packaging are functional.
The open six bar tray offers stability to the product while it is in transit,
in storage or on display. The tray is dearly superior protection to merely
wrapping six bars in plastic. However, it offers less stability and
protection than a closed carton. The tray also provides space to promote
and describe the product as well as a location for coupons. The clear
plastic overwrap provides only slight stability and protection, but permits
the consumer to view the product-a significant disadvantage of a closed
carton. The foil wrapper protects the ice cream bar and also provides a
means of holding the ice cream while it is eaten. The fold technique, a
deadfold wrap, is less secure than a heat sealed wrapper, but serves to
adequately contain the product and is easy to open or reseal. In
addition, there was evidence that the deadfold wrap is cheaper than a
heat sealed wrapper, and that the foil of the wrapper tends to denote
coldness and quality.
Given those considerations, the tray and plastic overwrap elements of
[the plaintiffs] trade dress are primarily functional.
Isaly Co., 619 F. Supp. at 991, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 806.
" AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
16 Among other unresolved issues is the extent to which the district court's and court of
appeals' focus in AmBrit on the mere existence of other designs in the relevant market
precludes consideration of additional factors. For example, although the district court cited
approvingly In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d' 1332, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9
(C.C.P.A. 1982), as establishing the relevant test for functionality, see Isaly Co., 619 F. Supp.
at 991, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 806, the existence of alternative designs was only one factor
taken into account by the Morton-Norwich court, with others including- (1) whether the
design was or is the subject of a utility patent; (2) whether the advertising of the design
owner touted the functional advantages of the design; and (3) whether the design is the
result of a comparatively simple or cheap manufacturing method. See 671 F.2d at 1340-41,
213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 15-16. whether the AmBrit courts' failure to consider these
additional Morton-Norwich factors was intentional or, alternatively, the result of insufficient
record evidence to allow their evaluation is not apparent from either opinion.
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(1) Inherently Distinctive Design Marks and Trade Dresses.
Well prior to the Supreme Court's holding to similar effect in Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc.,1  the Eleventh Circuit had
rejected the theory that non-verbal marks or trade dresses require
a demonstration of secondary meaning before they are eligible for
protection.1" Instead, the court's decisions adopted the view
that, by their very nature, some marks and trade dresses were
inherently distinctive and thus could function as indicators of origin
upon their adoption."6 7
The precise test for determining whether a particular design
mark or trade dress is inherently distinctive, however, is the
subject of some judicial disagreement in the Eleventh Circuit. In
one line of cases, the court has attempted to classify these designa-
tions into the same categories as word marks. In University of
Georgia Athletic Ass'n v. Laite,l" for example, the court found the
plaintiff's stylized bulldog design mark inherently distinctive after
concluding that the mark, when used for sports teams, was not
"descriptive," but was "at best, 'suggestive,' if not downright
168 112 S. Ct. 2753,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1992).
1 Prior to Two Pesos, the primary advocate of this theory had been the Second Circuit.
See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 656 (2d
Cir. 1985); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303-04, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 301 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).1 See, eg., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1164 (11th Cir. 1986) (foil wrapper for ice cream bars), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1541, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122,
1127 (11th Cir. 1985) (stylized English bulldog design for sports teams); Brooks Shoe Mfg.
Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1983)
(V-shaped design afixed to running shoe).
The decision to similar effect in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups,
Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 904 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), ert denied, 457 U.S.
1126 (1982) influenced the court's adoption of this point. Although decided on October 23,
1981, after the effective date of the Fifth-Eleventh Circuit split, section 9(3) of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995
(1980) designated Chevron a former Fifth Circuit case. Whatever congressional intent in this
designation, however, the Eleventh Circuit subsequently held in Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745 (11th Cir. 1982), that
Chevron was not binding authority, but was nevertheless *persuasive" in light of its being
based directly on case law of the former Fifth Circuit that was binding authority. Id. at 831
n.14, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 753 n.14.
168 756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (11th Cir. 1985).
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'arbitrary.' "'6 Similarly, in Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan
Research & Development Inc.,17 the court reversed a directed
verdict in the defendant's favor, noting in dictum that the trade
dress of the plaintiffs bottles "arguably has many of the indicia of
a suggestive mark and is therefore entitled to protection."1 7 1
In a subsequent case involving ornamentation attached to the
plaintiffs product, however, the court jettisoned the word mark
framework in favor of another test. Addressing the plaintiff's claim
in Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe Co.1"2 that the
district court improperly had required a demonstration of secondary
meaning, the court looked to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals for guidance. Citing with approval the latter's decision in
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 73 the court identi-
fied several factors that "should be considered" when determining
if a particular design is inherently distinctive: (1) whether the
design is a "common," or basic, shape or design; (2) whether it is
unique or unusual in a particular field; and (3) whether it is a mere
refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of
ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public
as a dress or ornamentation for the goods. 7' Applying this
standard, the court found that the common use in the industry of
the plaintiffs putative trade dress, together with its basic geometric
shape, precluded the design from being considered inherently
distinctive.176
- Id. at 1541, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1127 (footnote omitted). As the court justified this
conclusion:
We see very little connection between the attributes of an English
bulldog and, for example, the University of Georgia tennis team.
Furthermore, although the University of Georgia football team arguably
may possess some of the attributes of a bulldog, one could hardly call the
portrayal of a bulldog at issue in this case 'descriptive' of the average
University of Georgia football player.
Id. at 1541 n.16, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1127 n.16.
'" 656 F.2d 186, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
'Id. at 191 n.5, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 95 n.5 (dictum).
172 716 F.2d 854, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 536 (11th Cir. 1983).
'73 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (C.C.PA. 1977).
174 Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 857-58, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538.
'
75 Id. at 858, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538-39.
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Faced with these apparently incongruous tests, the court
attempted to reconcile them in AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,176 a
case that, unlike either Laite and Brooks Shoe, involved trade dress
consisting of the packaging for the plaintiffs goods. At trial, the
district court employed the Brooks Shoe analysis to find the
plaintiff's ice cream bar wrapper inherently distinctive. 177  On
appeal, however, the defendant countered with arguments that the
constituent elements of the plaintiffs trade dress connoted coldness
and, additionally, with evidence of their widespread usage on
similar or related goods." 8
Addressing these two challenges, the appellate court employed
both the Laite and Brooks Shoe analyses. Applying the former, it
concluded first that "[tihe trade dress does not describe the ice
cream product, rather it suggests to the consumer the coldness of
the product. Such trade dress is inherently distinctive .... ,179
Having made this determination, the court next rejected the
defendant's contention that widespread third-party usage of
individual elements of the plaintiffs trade dress rendered the
design a mere refinement of commonly adopted ornamentation:
[T]hird party use of one or more suggestive or
arbitrary elements of a plaintiff's trade dress renders
that trade dress indistinct only if the third party use
is so extensive and so similar to the plaintiff's that it
impairs the ability of consumers to use the trade
dress of the products to identify their source.'80
Although on its face the decision upheld the plaintiffs initial
victory, that the AmBrit court undertook to apply both Laite and
Brooks Shoe suggests that a design mark or trade dress satisfying
the Laite test may fall victim under Brooks Shoe to a finding of
"a 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).1
'
7 Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 988-89, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 803 (M.D.
Fla. 1985), affd sub nom. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
178 812 F.2d at 1536-37, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
17 Id. at 1537, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66.
n Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66.
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non-inherent distinctiveness on a showing of extensive third-party
usage. To a certain extent, this suggestion mirrors the axiom
generally applicable to word marks that a court may determine the
proper classification of a borderline descriptive or suggestive mark
through an examination of third-party usage.' s1 AmBrit's appar-
ent holding that an inherently distinctive trade dress can become
ineligible for protection as a result of third-party usage, however,
is without a corresponding principle in the doctrinal framework
generally applicable to word marks.
(2) Non-Inherently Distinctive Design Marks and Trade
Dresses. Like the owner of a descriptive mark, the owner of a
design mark or trade dress found not to be inherently distinctive
has the option of demonstrating that its designation of origin has
acquired distinctiveness in the form of secondary meaning. As with
word marks, there are two primary routes to fulfilling this
requirement. First, a would-be plaintiff may federally register its
mark or trade dress, thereby entitling it to the evidentiary
presumptions of section 33 of the Lanham Act." 2
Second, a plaintiff may demonstrate that its long-term usage of
its design mark or trade dress has created secondary meaning. As
with word marks,"a the proper inquiry in determining whether
secondary meaning exists is whether prospective consumers would
associate the design mark or trade dress with a particular
source."' Consequently, the putative owner of such a mark or
trade dress should expect its claims to fail if the use in the relevant
market of similar designs is such that this association is unlike-
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988); see, eg., McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435,435, 150
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 488,489 (th Cir. 1966) (plaintiff armed with federal registration of restau-
rant building design); National Ass'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co.,
362 F.2d 374, 375, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80, 80 (th Cir. 1966) (incontestable registrations of
design mark).
For a description of procedural advantages available to federal registrants under section
33 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1988), see supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
'"See, eg., Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 860, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 536,540 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying protection because plaintiffs V-shaped design mark
was not associated with particular source).
[Vol. 2:57
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ly. 85 Likewise, a plaintiff whose advertising historically has
stressed the purely functional characteristics of its design, rather
than the design's role as an indicator of origin, also will face a
difficult time meeting its burden on this issue.'8
2. Strength of a Mark or Trade Dress.
a. Determining Strength or Weakness. Under Eleventh Circuit
case law, "[tihe primary indicator of [mark or trade dress] strength
measures the logical correlation between a name and a product. If
a seller of a product or service would naturally use a particular
name, it is weakly protected."" 7 Thus, under this rule, a "strong"
mark or trade dress is one that is rarely used by parties other than
its owner, while a "weak" mark or trade dress is one that is often
used by other parties. "In short, the more distinctive a [mark or
trade dress], the greater its 'strength.' "188
As the secondary meaning requirement might suggest, descrip-
tive marks often are not strong ones. Because, by definition,
descriptive marks are those whose descriptive use is prevalent in
particular industries,"'e their nature frequently will render them
weak ones for purposes of likelihood of confusion analyses. In
Chappell v. Goltsman,"9" for example, the plaintiff owner of a
federal registration of the mark BAMA for preserves, jams, jellies,
and mayonnaise sought to bar the defendant's use of an identical
mark for wine. The district court, in an opinion affirmed by the
former Fifth Circuit, however, declined to enter the requested
relief. In substantial part, this holding was the result of the court's
finding of widespread third-party use of the plaintiff's putative
mark to describe a variety of goods and services having their origin
' See, eg., T.G.I. Friday's, Inc v. International Restaurant Group, Inc, 569 F.2d 895,
899, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1978) (declining to enjoin defendant's "obvious
copy" of plaintiff's restaurant trade dress on ground that no exclusive use shown by plaintifi).
Brooks Shoe, 716 F.2d at 860, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 541.
" Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176,1182,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123,127
(11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); see also Jellibeans, Inc. v.
Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 841 n.19, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 17 n.19 (11th Cir. 1983).
1 Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 504, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 387
(5th Cir. 1980).
'See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
99 F. Supp. 970, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (M.D. ALL 1951), affd as modified, 197 F.2d
837, 94 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (th Cir. 1952).
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in the state of Alabama." 1
Courts have not limited this principle to descriptive designations
of geographic origin. In Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in
America, Inc.,' the plaintiff federal registrant sought to enforce
its various HOLIDAY INN marks for hotel services against the
defendant's operation of HOLIDAY OUT IN AMERICA outdoor
campgrounds."8 Notwithstanding the presumption of secondary
meaning attaching to the plaintiffs registrations,1' however, the
former Fifth Circuit's analysis focused on the degree to which the
parties' competitors also did business under similar names.
Observing that "[plaintiff admits that the word 'Holiday' is used,
alone or in combination with words other than 'Inn,' throughout the
United States... to designate motels and restaurants not affiliated
in any way with plaintiff," the court concluded that "[tihe common
word 'Holiday' is of weak trademark significance."1  Accordingly,
the court affirmed the district court's denial of relief.'"
Significantly, even if the owner of a descriptive mark or non-
inherently distinctive trade dress has succeeded, through advertis-
ing and promotion, in creating a strong designation of origin, this
will not necessarily render the mark or trade dress protectable
against all arguably similar competitive uses. In part because of
the competitive need for particular industry members to employ
descriptive words and terms, the use of these designations as
marks is subject to another weakness largely unique to them,
namely, the so-called "fair use defense." This doctrine has a
statutory basis in section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, which provides
for the defense in a suit brought by the plaintiff owner of a
descriptive mark that "the use of the name, term, or device charged
to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark.., of a
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good
-1 See id. at 975-76, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 34 ('There are numerous business establish-
ments [in] Alabama which use the word Bama in their trade name.").
481 F.2d 445, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 446-47, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 257-58.
See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
Holiday Inns, 481 F.2d at 448, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258.
For criticism of this outcome, see generally Lunsford & Cohrs, supra note 27, at 1206;
Walter Derenberg, The Twenty-Seventh Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 339, 415 (1974).
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faith only to describe the goods and services of such party."197
Although invoking the common law rather than the statute, the
former Fifth Circuit first expressly recognized this defense in
Creamette Co. v. Conlin,'" a case involving the plaintiff's attempt
to protect its federally registered CREAMETTE mark for macaroni.
On the plaintiff's appeal from the district court's refusal to enjoin
the defendant's use of "Creamette" in connection with frozen
imitation cream desserts, the appellate court found little merit to
the plaintiffs arguments that its mark was not descriptive, and
hence entitled to broad protection. Even if the mark was arbitrary
or coined when applied to the plaintiffs macaroni products,'" "it
would not follow that the good faith use of the word by the
defendants on a product which it correctly indicates would alone
establish unfair competition."' Rather, the court concluded,
A frozen sweet, or dessert, which is not made from
the customary ice cream mix, but is similar to it,
may well be called Creamette because it is an imita-
tion or substitute of cream.
We think it true that a name may be arbitrary or
fanciful as applied to one or more products, but yet
not be entitled to unlimited protection as against its
good faith tradename adoption and use upon a
product of which, because of its inherent properties,
it is plainly and accurately descriptive in ordinary
meaning. As applied to such an article it is a non-
fanciful word because as thus used it is descrip-
tive.201
15 U.S.C. § 1115(bX4) (1988).
191 F.2d 108,90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160 (5th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
On the significance of these designations, see aupra notes 120-131 and accompanying
text.
"o 191 F.2d at 112, 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 162.
2" Id., 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 162.
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Accordingly, the court upheld the district court's denial of re-
lief.20
2
The court since has made clear that the fair use defense is
available only when, as in Creamette, the defendant's mark is, in
fact, descriptive of its goods or services. In Pure Foods, Inc. v.
Minute Maid Corp. ,2o8 the defendant-seller of frozen meat under
the designation "Minute Made"-attempted to rely on the fair use
defense against a suit grounded in the plaintiffs federal registra-
tion of the MINUTE MAID mark for frozen fruit-juice concen-
trate. ' The court, however, rejected the defendant's invocation
of section 33(b), noting:
Defendant argues that "minute" refers to the time for
cooking the meats and "made" means that the meats
are processed. While all of defendant's products are
processed, they could not truly be described as
"made" meat. It took much longer than a minute to
cook or prepare for serving most of the defendant's
products.'
Accordingly, the court held that the district court's rejection of the
defendant's fair use theory had not been clearly erroneous.2w
Despite the arguably inherent weakness of descriptive marks, at
least one panel of the court has held that a descriptive mark may
become strong merely by virtue of being the subject of a federal
registration that has become "incontestable" within the meaning of
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 162; see also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sta-Brite
Fluorescent Mfg., 308 F.2d 377, 382 (th Cir. 1962) (observing, in dictum, that -the plaintiff
cannot secure any right to the exclusive use of such a descriptive term as 'bright' when
applied to any kind of light, and when not used in such a manner as 'is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin..." (citation
omitted)).
214 F.2d 792, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271 (th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
'Id. at 797, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 274.
Id., 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 274.
Id.; cf. Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363, 367, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 616,518
(5th Cir. 1965) ("Since such use of [the defendants mark] incorporates the entire trademark
of the [plaintiff] and can not be excused as being descriptive of the [defendant's] product,
then it is, almost by definition, the equivalent of an infringing mark.').
100 [Vol. 2:57
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sections 15 and 33 of the Lanham Act.' In Dieter v. B & H
Industries,2° the district court entered a verdict for the defendant
after finding that the plaintiff's descriptive, but federally registered
SHUTTERWORLD mark, was a weak one entitled only to narrow
protection.2' On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that in light of the incontestable registration "Dieter's mark
... is presumed to be at least descriptive with secondary meaning,
and therefore a relatively strong mark."210 The court therefore
remanded the litigation with an instruction to the district court to
consider the incontestable status of the plaintiffs registration in
the likelihood of confusion analysis. 11
In addition to being arguably inconsistent with the court's prior
treatment of federal registrations,2" however, courts and com-
mentators have criticized the Dieter analysis as confusing the
separate and independent inquiries of whether the plaintiff is the
owner of an actual mark, on the one hand, and whether the
defendant's use is actionable, on the other.21 Specifically, the
2
" As set forth in supra notes 909 and accompanying text, a federal registrant that
complies with certain formalities after the fifth anniversary of the registration's issuance is
entitled to a conclusive presumption of the mark's validity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065, 1115
(1988). Where descriptive marks are concerned, this conclusive presumption relieves the
owner of the obligation to demonstrate secondary meaning as part of its prima facie case.
See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205-06, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
327, 334 (1985) ('A registrant may rely on the incontestable status of the mark.').
683 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 322, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990).
Id. at 1355-56.
210 880 F.2d 322, 329, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1726 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 498
U.S. 950 (1990).
21 1 1d., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
2
,' See, eg., Citibank, NA. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1547, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 292, 297 (11th Cir. 1984) ('The presumption of validity afforded plaintiffs [registered]
mark under the Lanham Act is not material to [whether confusion is likely].')2
" See, eg., Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
634, 637 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) ("Incontestable status does not
make a weak mark strong.'); see al8o 1 JEROME GHISON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRACTICE § 4.03[3][a][vi], at 4-39 (1993 ed.) (Since even the owner of an incontestably
registered mark must prove likelihood of confusion... the defendant should be entitled to
reply on the weakness of the mark in attempting to disprove the claim.); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt i, at 209 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) (Trhe test
for likelihood of confusion is the perception of consumers in the marketplace, which generally
is unaffected by the status of the mark's registration.'). Indeed, because Dieters holding on
this point is in direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Munters Corp. v. Mataui
America, Inc., 909 F.2d 250,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1016
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secondary meaning inquiry itself addresses only the threshold issue
of whether the mark or trade dress is protectable, and is properly
of limited relevance to determinations of the strength of the mark
or trade dress for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis.214 That suggestive marks or inherently distinctive trade
dresses frequently are considered strong indicators of origin 215 is
more a happenstance of their relationship to the underlying goods
and services than a necessary function of it.
For example, notwithstanding the ability of the owner of a
suggestive mark or inherently distinctive trade dress to protect
itself from likely confusion absent a demonstration of secondary
meaning, these indicators of origin are not necessarily strong ones.
In Freedom Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Way,21l an Eleventh Circuit
panel declined to disturb as clearly erroneous the trial court's
finding that the primary component of the plaintiff's mark, the
word "Freedom," was suggestive when applied to banking servic-
es. 2" Despite this holding, however, the court refused to accept
the plaintiff's apparent invitation to find its mark a strong one.
Rather, although attaching some importance to "the relationship
between the name and the service or good it describes," the court
(1990), the Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Dieter. See
Pasquale A. Razzano, Incontestability: Should it Be Given any Effect in a Likelihood of
Confusion Determination, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 409, 422 (1992).
21, As the court explained in AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987):
The strength of a particular trade dress is determined by a number of
factors that establish its standing in the marketplace. Relying on its
finding that the trade dress was inherently distinctive and had acquired
secondary meaning, the district court concluded that the (plaintiffs]
trade dress was strong. A more thorough analysis, however, is needed
to determine the scope of protection appropriate for the [plaintiffs] trade
dress. A finding ofinherent distinctiveness indicates that the [plaintiff s)
trade dress will be protected, but the.appropriate degree of protection is
determined by examining a number of factors that establish the standing
of the trade dress in the marketplace: most notably, the type of trade
dress and the extent of the third party uses.
Id. at 1539, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (footnote omitted).
" See, eg., Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 315, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844, 847 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (*A strong mark is usually fictitious,
arbitrary or fanciful and is generally inherently distinctive.').
216 757 F.2d 1176, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
211Id. at 1183, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 127.
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nevertheless held that "the strength of a mark [also] depends on
the extent of third-party usage."21 Finding probative the defen-
dant's evidence of such usage, the court upheld the trial court's
holding in the defendant's favor.
Indeed, although the complete absence of a relationship between
an arbitrary mark or inherently distinctive trade dress and its
associated good or service might otherwise suggest the existence of
a strong indicator of origin,219 this result does not necessarily
hold. In Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,' the former Fifth
Circuit addressed the legality of an injunction entered against the
defendant's use of its DOMINO'S PIZZA mark, which had been
found by the trial court to infringe the plaintiffs arbitrary DOMI-
NO mark for sugar. In reversing, the appellate court found
persuasive the defendant's evidence that the word "Domino" was
widely used as a trademark for a variety of goods. Although the
court did not hold that "plaintiffs mark [was] not a distinctive,
well-known mark for its sugar and related products," it neverthe-
less concluded in overturning a finding of likely confusion that the
pervasive third-party usage significantly limited the mark's
strength outside of those applications made by the plaintiff.22'
What constitutes acceptable evidence of third-party usage in the
Eleventh Circuit is the subject of some uncertainty. For the most
21 Id. at 1182, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126.
21 See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 504, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
384, 387 (5th Cir. 1980) ('Our review of the record establishes that EXXON is a strong
trademark. There is no evidence in the record indicating that any other party besides Exxon
Corporation uses EXXON.').
615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
2'ld. at 260, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 975.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844 (5th Cir. 1981), in which it also reversed as
clearly erroneous a finding that confusion was likely. Although declining to disturb the trial
court's determination that the plaintiff's SUN BANKS mark was an arbitrary one, the court
distinguished the threshold protectability inquiry from the consideration of the strength of
the mark factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis by observing. 'Arbitrariness refers
to the quality of a mark, i.e., that it bears no relation to the service provided. The ultimate
strength of a mark, the key inquiry before us, is determined by a number of factors which
establish its standing in the marketplace.* Id. at 315, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 848. Taking
into consideration the defendant's 'impressive array of third party single and multiword uses
of the SUN mark,' the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims to an expansive zone of
protection for its mark by overturning the plaintiffs victory at trial. Id. at 315-16, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 848.
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part, the court has accepted as evidence of third-party usage such
submissions as copies of federal registrations of similar marks,222
the existence of business registrations of similar names with state
agencies,' and previous claims by the plaintiff to similar effect
in earlier unrelated litigation.2' Consistent with the absence of
a requirement that marks be identical for purposes of determining
the likelihood of confusion between them,' the weakness of a
mark or trade dress may be demonstrated by the use of merely
similar designations of origin in the same field.'
Despite the court's traditional reliance on these types of evidence,
however, a prudent Eleventh Circuit defendant should be prepared
to go beyond a mere recitation of arguably relevant third-party
marks. In Turner v. H M H Publishing Co.,' for example, the
defendant attempted to demonstrate the weakness of the plaintiffs
PLAYBOY mark by brandishing copies of "a number" of federal
certificates of registration for the mark.' The former Fifth
Circuit, however, found the certificates of limited probative value
of the mark's actual use and the significance of any such use: "We
will not assume any knowledge ... of the purchasing public by
mere registrations in the Patent Office, nor will we assume that the
marks are in continuing use, so as to have any effect on the mind
of the purchasing public merely because they had been so regis-
= See, eg., Amstar, 615 F.2d at 259, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 975 (aWe do not believe that
... extensive third-party use and registration of[a mark] can be... readily dismissed.'); El
Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 725, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1954)
("The evidence discloses such extensive use of the words El Chico as to bring them within
the classification of a 'weak' trade name.*).
m See, eg., Sun Banks, Inc., 651 F.2d at 316, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 848 (considering
evidence that "over 4,000 businesses registered with the Florida Secretary of State used the
word 'Sun' in their names'); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161,
169, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
22 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 445,448,178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
257, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1973).
' See infra notes 237-252 and accompanying text.
AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (11th
Cir. 1986) (extending less protection on basis of third-party uses of "isolated elemente of
plaintiffs trade dress), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
2, 380 F.2d 224, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967).
Id. at 228 n.2, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332 n.2; cf. University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v.
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 n.27, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1131 n.27 (11th Cir. 1985) ('The
proper inquiry is whether the unauthorized third-party uses significantly diminish the
public's perception that the mark identifies items connected with the owner of the mark.*).
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tered." z Likewise, the court may also disregard a list of third-
party uses in the absence of a showing that the uses are in any way
related to those of the parties to the litigation. Thus, in Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,"s the court rejected
the defendant's proffered evidence of third-party usage in substan-
tial part because "[aill ... [the uses] seem involved in relatively
specialized businesses not closely related to the fairly general retail
trade of Safeway Stores.""1
b. Effects of Strength or Weakness. Once a trial court in the
Eleventh Circuit has assessed the strength of a designation of
origin this determination frequently plays a large role in the
ultimate likelihood of confusion analysis. For example, that
"'[sitrong marks are widely protected, as contrasted to weak
marks' " is apparent from the court's decisions.' Conse-
quently, the classification of a plaintiffs designation as strong or
weak holds the potential for outweighing other factors.
The most frequent victim of this classification is the inquiry into
the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between the parties' goods
and services mandated by Roto-Rooter. A mark or trade dress
deemed to be strong can slice across wide gulfs in goods or services
to secure protection against infringing uses for its owner. Thus, in
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2 4 the owner
w Turner, 380 F.2d at 228 n.2, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332 n.2.
2w 675 F.2d 1160, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599 (11th Cir. 1982).
n"Id. at 1165,216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 603; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Goberna, 128 F.2d
806,807,54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45,46 (5th Cir. 1942) (Mrhe [defendants] point out that the word
GREYHOUND is used in Miami in connection with dog racing, and as the name of several
business establishments. They concede, however, that [plaintiffs] have earned the right to
use the name in connection with the bus transportation business ..... ). For an example of
this analysis reaching a contrary result, namely, a holding that the defendantes evidence of
third-party usage was relevant, see Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496,
505 n.13, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 27 n.13 (5th Cir.) ("World tries to distinguish between the
use of WORLD by retailers as opposed to manufacturers. Insofar as consumers are
concerned, the distinction seems tenuous.*), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
n Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 261,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 975
(5th Cir.) (quoting Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Trademark Basics, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 878
(1969)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
mSee, eg., id. at 259, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 975 ("[Tlhe strength and distinctiveness of
[a] plaintiffs mark is a vital consideration in determining the scope of protection it should
be accorded.*).
2, 306 F.2d 433, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 985
(1963).
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of the massively promoted WHERE THERE'S LIFE... THERE'S
BUD mark for beer was able to enjoin the defendant's use of
WHERE THERE'S LIFE... THERE'S BUGS for its (presumably)
unrelated product, namely, a combination insecticide and floor wax.
Similarly, the University of Georgia Athletic Association successful-
ly asserted its strong stylized bulldog design mark for "services
related to sports activities" against the manufacturer of BATTLIN'
BULLDOG beer, which featured a similar canine.' In contrast,
however, the owner of a weak mark or trade dress may be unable
to protect it against similar uses on virtually identical goods or
services. 2se
B. SIMILARITY OR DISSIMILARITY OF MARKS OR TRADE DRESSES
1. Determining the Degree of Similarity or Dissimilarity. In
Eskay Drugs, Inc. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 2 7 the
former Fifth Circuit rejected the principle that to be found liable for
unfair competition a defendant must adopt a designation of origin
identical to the plaintiff's.' Under this rule, the degree of
similarity between two parties' marks or trade dresses is "'really
nothing more than a subjective eyeball test.' "" In applying this
test, "[tihe similarity of design is determined by considering the
overall impression created by the mark as a whole rather than
2"See University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122
(11th Cir. 1985) (suit successfully brought "against wholesaler of novelty beers, who
marketed beer cans portraying an English Bulldog [that] infringed on the... Bulldog chosen
by the university as a symbol for its athletic teams').
See, eg., Swatch Watch, SAL v. Taxor, Inc., 785 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986) (no
likelihood of confusion between watches sold under SWATCH and T-WATCH marks); Sun
Banks v. Sun Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981) (no likelihood of
confusion between SUN FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION and SUN
BANKS, INC.); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979) (no likelihood of confusion resulting
from use of WORLD in ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. and WORLD CARPETS,
INC.).
188 F.2d 430, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (5th Cir. 1951).
2
" Id. at 431-32, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203-04.
1 Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 504, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 388
(5th Cir. 1980) (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMAPIM AND UNFAnR COMPETMON §
237:7 (1973)); accord Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1540, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying identical standard in trade dress context), cert denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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simply comparing individual features of the marks."4 ° Thus, it
is improper to dissect the marks or trade dresses under consider-
ation into their individual components.21
Applications of the court's "overall impression" test have on
occasion reached incongruous results. In Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell
Bakeries, Inc.2' for example, the court upheld the district court's
finding of no likelihood of confusion between the parties' respective
DANDY and DANDEE marks, despite the marks' use on identical
goods. Similarly, in Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange,
2 U
another panel of the court reached a similar result after examining
the parties' EXXON and TEX-ON marks,2" albeit over the dis-
sent of Judge Brown who, recanting his earlier participation in
Webb's City, had come to object to "the notion that confusion
dissipates by a simple hyphen."'
'Exon Corp., 628 F.2d at 504-05, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 388; see also Jellibeans, Inc.
v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833,842,222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 18 (11th Cir. 1983) (determining
degree of similarity between two marks "by considering the overall impression created by the
marks'); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 260-61, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
969, 926 (5th Cir.) (" 'Similarity of appearance is determined on the basis of the total effect
of the designation, rather than on a comparison of arbitrary features.'" (citation omitted)),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496,
502, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 24 (5th Cir.) (-A mark must be viewed in its entirety and in
context. It is the overall impression that counts.*), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
"' See Crown Overall Mfg. Co. v. Chahin, 200 F.2d 935,936,96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 104. 104-
05 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that plaintiffs composite marks, composed of design and word
element, were "not properly dissectible" into individual elements).
2" 226 F.2d 700, 107 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 233 (5th Cir. 1955).
su 628 F.2d 500, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384 (5th Cir. 1980).
2" See id. at 507-08, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 390 ( T]he district court did not err in
holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between Tex-On and Exxon."). The E.xon
court did, however, find that the defendant's use of TEXON (without a hyphen) was likely
to cause confusion. See id. at 507, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 390 (The district court was clearly
erroneous when it concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion between TEXON and
EXXON.*).
2, Id. at 509, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 391 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
Curiously enough, the court held in one early case that the existence of a hyphen in the
mark of one party (but not that of the other) increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood
of confusion between the parties' marks. In Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Stevens, 15 F.2d
312 (5th Cir. 1926), the plaintiff owner of the HY-TEX mark initially failed to secure
injunctive relief against the defendant's use of HYFRAX as a mark for similar goods. On the
plaintiffs appeal, however, the court declined to hold that differences between the parties'
marks precluded confusion between them in part because "[elach word begins with Hy and
each ends with an '; they are made of equal length by substituting the letter f in the latter
for the hyphen in the former." Id. at 313.
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In stark contrast, however, the court also has proven willing to
ignore minor differences between designations of origin in holding
confusion likely between, for example, CITIBANK and
CITIBANC,2 F. REMY and REMY MARTIN, 7 and two styl-
ized English bulldog designs differing primarily in the lengths of
their tails.' Indeed, in Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs,4 the
court apparently jettisoned altogether reliance on the physical
appearance of the marks themselves in holding that the marks
JELLIBEANS and LOLLIPOPS-easily distinguishable on their
face-created the same general impression when used as names for
competing roller-skating rinks.m
To the extent that these cases can be reconciled, it is on the basis
of the strengths of the underlying marks or trade dresses at issue.
In Sun Banks v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan As'n," the court
overturned the trial court's determination that the defendant's SUN
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASS'N mark was likely to be
confused with the plaintiff's SUN BANKS designation. Focusing on
visual dissimilarities between the parties' marks, the court
observed that such dissimilarities should be given greater weight
if the similarities-the common word "Sun"-would be weak
indicators of origin in and of themselves. As the court explained,
"[w]hether an addition is sufficient to prevent confusion in a
particular instance depends upon the strength of the main part of
the mark and the distinctiveness of the additional feature. Where
a trademark is itself weak, minor additions may effectively negate
any confusing similarity. " 2
-" Citibank, NA v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1547, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292,
298 (11th Cir. 1984).
11 E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1131, 1134-35 (11th Cir. 1985).
' University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1545 n.21, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1122, 1131 n.21 (11th Cir. 1985).
716 F.2d 833, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10 (11th Cir. 1983).
2 o Id. at 842, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 18.
261 651 F.2d 311, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844 (5th Cir. 1981).
2n Id. at 316, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 849.
For another example of this methodology in action, see Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596
F.2d 111, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980), which
involved the plaintiffs attempt to ejoin use of the defendant's PEARLE VISION CENTER
service mark. Finding that the only similarities between the parties' marks consisted of the
descriptive words VISION CENTER, the court held the defendant's addition of a prefix to
(Vol. 2:57108
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2. The Effects of Similarity or Dissimilarity. Once a court has
determined the degree of similarity between two marks or trade
dresses, the weight of such a determination within the likelihood
of confusion analysis is a somewhat unsettled issue in the Eleventh
Circuit. Obviously, there must be a threshold level of similarity
before the other likelihood of confusion factors may come into
play.' Moreover, it is equally apparent that "the greater the
similarity in the design of the trademarks, the greater the likeli-
hood of confusion."2" Notwithstanding these generally clear
principles, however, the extent to which this factor may influence
the ultimate likelihood of confusion analysis has proven to be the
subject of considerable judicial debate.
The court's early decisions addressing the issue strongly suggest-
ed that this factor was an important one. In Frostie Co. v. Dr.
Pepper Co.,' for example, although noting that "all relevant
evidence should be considered," the court observed that [in
determining whether there was likelihood of confusion, a matter as
to which there was no substantial evidence, we are of the view that
a mere ocular examination of the two marks might permit the trial
court to make its conclusion.' Similarly, in National Ass'n of
Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Insurance Co., 7 the
court reversed the trial court's finding that confusion was unlikely
by holding that "[w]e need only compare to the two symbols as they
appear in the exhibits which are before the Court and to mentally
juxtapose the two word-marks as they appear in print... to find
that confusion is not only likely, but probable.' 2  A similar
result occurred in Beef/Eater Restaurants, Inc. v. James Burrough
those words legally sufficient to preclude liability: "The emphasis placed on the word
PEARLE further absolves [the defendant] from any charge of deception or unfair competition,
and under Louisiana law the addition of this identifying prefix is legally sufficient to
distinguish [the defendantes] business from the [plaintiffs].' Id. at 118,202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 340-41 (footnotes omitted).
'Cf., Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
19, 25 (5th Cir.) (-Once the Court's finding of similarity of marks is rejected, the other factors
... appear insignificant.'), cert denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
' Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 505, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 388
(5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
2m 341 F.2d 363, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 516 (5th Cir. 1965).
mId. at 367, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 519 (footnote omitted).
27 362 F.2d 374, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (5th Cir. 1966).
'Id. at 378, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 83.
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Ltd.," in which the court rejected the appellant's argument that
the trial court had failed to give appropriate weight to the absence
of actual confusion with the observation that "[aippellant ...
overlooks the principle of law that the trial judge, by inspection of
the trademarks, may himself determine, and must determine, the
likelihood of confusion."260
These decisions did not, however, prepare the trademark bar for
the court's apparent holding in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n,
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc."1 that a close
similarity between marks could support a finding of a likelihood of
confusion, separately and independently of any consideration of the
other Roto-Rooter factors. In Boston Professional Hockey, the
defendant made and sold embroidered cloth symbols of various
National Hockey League teams. As the court observed in distin-
guishing these facts from those in its prior decisions, "[the
difficulty with this case stems from the fact that .... [tihe
statutory and case law of trademarks is oriented toward the use of
such marks to sell something other than the mark itself."
2 1
The court made short work of this difficulty, however, in rejecting
the defendant's argument that its customers were unlikely to think
that the emblems originated from the plaintiffs:
This argument misplaces the purpose of the [Lanham
Act's] confusion requirement. The confusion or deceit
requirement is met by the fact that the defendant
duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them
to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams' trademarks. The certain
knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of
the trademark symbols were in [the] plaintiffs
satisfies the requirement of the act. The argument
that confusion must be as to the source of the manu-
facture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where
"398 F.2d 637, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562 (5th Cir. 1968).
2w Id. at 639, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 563; cf. University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laits, 756
F.2d 1535, 1543-44, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding results of
'cursory visual examination" probative of likelihood of confusion).
61510 F.2d 1004, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
Id. at 1010, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 368.
[Vol. 2:57
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the trademark ... is the triggering mechanism for
the sale of the emblem.'
The court thus held that the plaintiffs had a property right in the
marks themselves, separate and independent from the traditional
trademark right to use the mark as an indicator of the source of a
product.' Consequently, under Boston Professional Hockey, any
use of a mark constituted infringement per se, provided that
consumers recognized that the plaintiff owned the mark.
Less than two years later, another panel of the court qualified
Boston Professional Hockey's apparent wholesale disposal of the
remaining likelihood of confusion factors. In Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,' the plaintiff fast
food franchisor sought to enjoin the defendant's sale to the
plaintiff's franchisees of, inter alia, carry-out chicken boxes bearing
colorable imitations of the plaintiffs distinctive red-and-white
striped trade dress. Although it affirmed the district court's
holding in the plaintiffs favor, the court renewed its adherence to
the full-blown likelihood of confusion analysis, noting that "[olur
cases demonstrate unbroken insistence upon likelihood of confusion,
and by doing so they reject any notion that a trademark is an
owner's 'property' to be protected irrespective of its role in the
operation of our markets."2w Distinguishing Boston Professional
Hockey, the Kentucky Fried Chicken panel noted that in the earlier
case the facts "supported the inescapable inference that many
[consumers] would believe that the product itself originated with or
was somehow endorsed by [the plaintiffl]." 7
Subsequent to the Fifth-Eleventh Circuit split,' the modern
Fifth Circuit effectively has repudiated the Boston Professional
Hockey rule that the mere use of a plaintiffs trademark can
2 Id. at 1012, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 369.
2 Id. at 1014, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 371.
3 549 F.2d 368, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649 (th Cir. 1977).
w Id. at 388-89, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 667 (citation omitted).
2 7 Id. at 389, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668.
20 See supra note 6.
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constitute infringement per se.' Notwithstanding this retreat,
however, the Eleventh Circuit not only has expressly reaffirmed the
earlier case's infringement per se analysis in University of Georgia
Athletic Ass'n v. Laite,270 but has defended its predecessor court
against withering attacks from the Ninth Circuit. 1
Notwithstanding the continued viability of the infringement per
se rule, the doctrine's applicability appears to be limited to facts
such as those in Boston Professional Hockey and Laite, namely,
those involving so-called "identification goods" whose marks'
reproductions frequently represent the actual commodity being
sold. In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,"
for example, a panel of the court that included the future author of
m See Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d
1079, 1085 n.7, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757, 763 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) ("It is not enough that
typical buyers purchase the items because of the presence of the mark; it must be shown that
they would purchase the items because the presence of the mark indicates to them the
necessary connection between the items themselves and the owner of the mark.').
"0 756 F.2d 1535, 1547, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1131 (11th Cir. 1985).
"'The sharpest judicial attack on the Boston Professional Hockey per se doctrine occurred
in International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 718 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981), which accused the former Fifth
Circuit as having "extended the protection [of trademark law] beyond that intended by
Congress and beyond that accorded by any other court.' Id. at 919, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at
725. With respect to Boston Profesional Hockes underlying assumption that consumers
purchasing goods bearing reproductions of a plaintiff s trademarks would assume that the
goods were sponsored or authorized by the plaintiff, the Job1s Daughters court noted that "it
would be naive to conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe
that the product somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name
or emblem signifies.' Id. at 918, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 724. In response, the Eleventh
Circuit observed:
We respectfully disagree. The record in the instant case reveals that,
in one week, at least ten to fifteen members of the public contacted [the
plaintiff] to inquire about the connection between [the defendant's
product] and the [plaintiff]. This evidence indicates that, contrary to the
unsupported assertion of the Ninth Circuit in Job's Daughters, at least
some members of the public do assume that products bearing the mark
of a school or a sports team are sponsored or licensed by the School or
team....
Furthermore, in our view, most consumers who purchase products
containing the name or emblem of their favorite school or sports team
would prefer an officially sponsored or licensed product to an [unlicensed]
product. Were this not true, the word 'official' would not appear in so
many advertisements for such products.
Laite, 756 F.2d at 1547 n.28, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1131 n.28 (citations omitted).
2" 675 F.2d 1160, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599 (11th Cir. 1982).
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the opinion in Laite failed to mention Boston Professional Hockey
at all in applying a standard likelihood of confusion analysis to find
that the defendant's use of the SAFEWAY mark infringed the
plaintiffs rights to the identical mark. Indeed, other than Boston
Professional Hockey and Laite, no decision of the court has applied
the "triggering mechanism" analysis, suggesting that outside of the
identification goods context this factor remains just that-a single
factor, rather than a test in and of itself. 8
C. SIMILARITY OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
The court's statements of the importance of this factor often are
deceptively simple: 'That the products [or services] involved are
similar is evidence tending to prove the existence of a likelihood of
confusion."27  "The greater the similarity between the products
and services, the greater the likelihood of confusion."275 Thus,
holdings of infiingement are more likely to occur in cases in which
the parties' wares are identical,276 while a "complete dissimilari-
ty" in goods and services weighs toward a finding that confusion is
unlikely.2"7
It is apparent, however, that an identity of goods or services is
not a requirement for a finding of likelihood of confusion:
' See, eg., Wesco Mfg. v. Tropical Attractions, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484,1489, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing holding in defendant's favor on ground that
[t]he court incorrectly focused solely on the degree of visual similarity between the two
marks").
74 AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1541, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1169 (11th
Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
' Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 505, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 388
(5th Cir. 1980).
7 See, eg., AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1541-42, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (that products are
similar is evidence tending to prove existence of likelihood of confusion.); Jellibeans, Inc. v.
Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 842 (11th Cir. 1983); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754 (11th Cir. 1982) (fT]he
likelihood of confusion rests on an evaluation of a variety of factors including ... the
similarity of product."); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160,
1166, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 603 (11th Cir. 1982) (weighing product similarities).
"7 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 167, 114 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 19, 22 (5th Cir.) ("The complete dissimilarity of the articles in whose sale (the] mark
is used .... [is] relevant to the determination of whether there ... is 'likelihood' of
confusion.*), ert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
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Often and recently we have made plain that direct
competition between the products is not a prerequi-
site to protective relief.... Confusion, or the likeli-
hood of confusion, not competition, is the real test of
trademark infringement. Whether or not direct
competition exists is but one of the elements to be
considered in determining whether there is or will be
a likelihood of confusion.7
On one level, applications of this standard are likely to turn on
the logical connection between particular non-competing goods and
services. 79 Often this association is natural, as in cases acknowl-
edging the possibility of actionable confusion between similar
marks used in connection with, for example, wine and brandy,'
s Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861, 153
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted). For another observation by the
court to similar effect, see Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 796-97, 102
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 274 (5th Cir.) (citation and quotations omitted) cert. denied, 348 U.S.
888 (1954):
One's interest in a trade-mark or trade name came to be protected
against simulation ... not only on competing goods, but on goods so
related in the market to those on which the trade-mark or trade name
is used that the good or ill repute of the one type of goods is likely to be
visited upon the other. Thus, one's interest in a trade-mark or trade
name is protected against being subjected to the hazards of another's
business.
s As the court has explained:
Trademark jurisprudence ... has long recognized that the lack of
competitiveness is not always dispositive of the question of confusion and
hence infringement. One such relationship where this is true exists
when the sponsor or maker of one business or product might naturally
be assumed to be the maker or sponsor of another business or product.
The confusion evident in such cases is confusion of the business; the
deceived customer buys the infringer's product in the belief that it
originates with the trademark owner or that it in some way is affiliated
with the owner. When this occurs, the infiinger is unjustly trading on
the true owner's established reputation. This is the precise wrong
trademark legislation seeks to prevent.
World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 488, 168 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1971).
' E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1530, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1131, 1134 (11th Cir. 1985).
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food and gin," whisky and cigars,'m  bus transportation and
sightseeing tours,'m  airplane engines and automobile en-
gines, 2N golf courses and golfers' associations,W5 and shrimp
processing services and processed shrimp.'m
As previously indicated, however, the emphasis given to the
apparent connection between the parties' goods and services often
varies with the court's determination of the strength of the
plaintiff's mark or trade dress.2 7 Thus, a finding that the plain-
tiffs mark or trade dress is weak will reduce significantly the
weight accorded to the fact that both parties' goods or services are
edible,' or involve insurance, ' holiday lodging,"' or bank-
ing services." Indeed, in the face of such a finding, even an
identity of the parties' lines of business may not warrant a
'l See Beef/Eater Restaurants, Inc. v. James Burrough, Ltd., 398 F.2d 637, 639, 158
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562,564 (5th Cir. 1968) (confusion likely between BEEFEATER restaurants
and BEEFEATER gin).
I See Tampa Cigar Co. v. John Walker & Sons, Ltd., 222 F.2d 460, 461, 105 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 351, 351 (5th Cir. 1955) (confusion likely between JOHNNIE WALKER cigars and
JOHNNIE WALKER whiskey).
' See Greyhound Corp. v. Goberna, 128 F.2d 806, 807, 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45, 47 (5th
Cir. 1942) (confusion likely between GREYHOUND bus travel and GREYHOUND tours).
I" See Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861, 153
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1967) (confusion likely between CONTINENTAL
AVIATION airplane engines and CONTINENTAL MOTORS automobile engines).
" See Professional Golfers Ass'n v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670, 186
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1975) (confusion likely between identical marks used for
golf courses and golfers' association).
mSee Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508,1514,224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552,556 (11th
Cir. 1984) (confusion likely between use of SINGLETON name in connection with shrimp
processing services and processed shrimp).
See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
See, eg., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258-59, 205 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 969, 974-75 (5th Cir.) (no likelihood of confusion between DOMINO'S PIZZA and
DOMINO sugar), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, Inc. v. Sunaid
Food Prods., Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 489, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238 (5th Cir. 1966) (no likelihood
of confusion between SUNAID fruit products and SUN-MAID RAISINS).
" See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 168, 114 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 19, 23 (5th Cir.) (ALL STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY unlikely to be
confused with ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
m See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., Inc., 461 F.2d 445, 448, 178 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1973) (no likelihood of confusion between HOLIDAY OUT and
HOLIDAY INNS, beth for lodging services).
" See Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 319, 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 844, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1981) (no likelihood of confusion between SUN FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION and SUN BANKS, INC.).
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conclusion that confusion is likely.=
The contrary proposition holds with equal force. Under appropri-
ate circumstances, a strong mark's fame may assist dramatically its
owner's ability to challenge use of similar marks on differing goods.
Thus, the defendant in Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.2 was unable to interest the former Fifth Circuit in
the differences between floor wax and beer in the face of "the good
will created by the tremendous expenditure in advertising by the
plaintiff.' 4  Likewise, in another beer case, the court made
equally short shrift of the defendant's claim that "no one actually
believes that the University of Georgia has gone into the brewing
business" after finding that the plaintiff's mark, used in connection
with sports teams, was a strong one.2 6
D. SIMILARITY OF RETAIL OUTLETS AND PURCHASERS
"Dissimilarities between the retail outlets for and the predomi-
nant consumers of plaintiffs' and defendants' goods lessen the
possibility of confusion, mistake, or deception.' Similarly, an
identity of purchasers and outlets weighs in favor of a holding that
confusion is likely.2 Significantly, however, the court has
m See, eg., Swatch Watch, S.A. v. Taxor, Inc., 785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
391, 392 (11th Cir. 1986) (no likelihood of confusion between watches sold under SWATCH
and T-WATCH marks); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 601, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19,24 (5th Cir.) (no likelihood of confusion between ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC. and WORLD CARPETS, INC.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
306 F.2d 433, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (5th Cir. 1962), cerL denied, 372 U.S. 965
(1963).
Id. at 438, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 528.
2" University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1545-46, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1122, 1130 (11th Cir. 1985).
' Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,262,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969,977
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); accord John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 976, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 524 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The greater the
similarity between the products and services, the greater the likelihood of confusion.*); Exxon
Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 605, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1980)
(same).
I See, e.g., American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619,624, 136 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1963) (noting that goods sold -in same outlets to the same class of
purchasers" indicates greater likelihood of confusion); Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp.,
214 F.2d 792, 797,102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271,274 (5th Cir.) (observing that products purchased
by 'common purchasers ... through common outlets' indicates greater likelihood of
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suggested that this factor is, in and of itself, of insufficient weight
to support a finding of infringement or noninfringement as a
matter of law.2w
Early decisions of the court, particularly those involving food,
displayed a tendency to apply the "housewife" test, with the
perceptiveness of this buying population typically faring poorly in
the court's estimation. As the court noted in Pure Foods, Inc. v.
Minute Maid Corp.,2 in support of its holding that confusion was
likely between the parties' marks:
PlaintifFs frozen fruit juice concentrates and defen-
dant's frozen meats are both purchased by common
purchasers, housewives, through common outlets,
retail stores, and are displayed in the frozen food
departments in those stores, often in locations not
far apart. A number of housewives testified to their
actual confusion and mistake in buying the defen-
dant's products on their faith in the plaintiff's
reputation. °
Similarly, a separate panel of the court in American Foods, Inc. v.
Golden Flake, Inc."' also upheld a finding of infringement in part
on the ground that [i]t was undisputed that the products in
question, all falling into the food category, are sold in the same
types of stores, and on occasion in the same locations in the stores,
and in the main are purchased by housewives during the course of
grocery shopping."' 2
confusion), cert denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
Obviously, it may be possible to have an identity of one of these elements without an
identity of the other. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 505-06, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 388
(finding identity of parties' customers but not of retail outlets).
' See Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192, 213
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91, 96 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (comparing 'retail outlets- used by parties is
an inadequate basis for directed verdict').
214 F.2d 792, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (194).
mo Id. at 797, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 274.
801 312 F.2d 619, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286 (5th Cir. 1963).
m Id. at 622-23, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 288. For a similar analysis, but reaching a
different result from that in Minute Maid and Golden Fake, see Sun-Maid Raisin Growers
v. Sunaid Food Products, Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 468, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238, 238 (5th Cir.
1966) (per curiam) (upholding finding of no likelihood of confusion despite fact that " the
1994] 117
61
Davis: Likelihood of Confusion Determinations: A Survey of Eleventh Circ
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Consistent with this analysis, the court's most significant
treatment of this factor came in Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc.,' a case that also involved homemakers. In Amstar, the
manufacturer of DOMINO sugar sought to enjoin the defendant's
use of the DOMINO'S PIZZA mark. Although the plaintiff was
successful at trial, the former Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs
efforts to demonstrate a similarity in purchasers. In the face of
evidence that the defendant's customers were "primarily young
(85.6% under 35 years of age), single (61%) males (63.3%)," while
those of the plaintiff were "middle-aged housewives," the court
concluded that "[there are substantial dissimilarities between the
predominant purchasers of plaintiff's and defendants' prod-
ucts."'3 In addition to this evidence weighing against the trial
court's determination that confusion was likely, the appellate court
found these purchaser differences sufficient to render a survey
conducted among a population consisting mostly of the plaintiff's
customer base worthy only of limited weight.'
E. SIMILARITY OF ADVERTISING MEDIA
Although the weight properly given to similarity or dissimilarity
in advertising media in the likelihood of confusion analysis varies,
this factor, as a general rule, has never been an overriding one. On
the most basic level, it is apparent that similarities in advertising
media are probative of a likelihood of confusion. Thus, in uphold-
ing the district court's finding that confusion was likely in7Exxon
Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange,'" the court noted that "[tihe
greater the similarity in the campaigns, the greater the likelihood
of confusion. In the case at bar, both plaintiff and defendant use
virtually identical advertising media. Both parties used radio,
television, newspaper ads, yellow page ads, and large signs
goods of both parties are normally sold in food stores and purchased by the same consumers,
usually grocery shopping housewives").
3w 615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
3' Id. at 262, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978.
a See id. at 264, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 979 (holding that purchaser differences
asignificantly reduce [the survey's] probative value').
a 628 F.2d 500, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384 (5th Cir. 1980).
118 [Vol. 2:57
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identifying their places of business."307 That individual media do
not carry both parties' advertisements is irrelevant if their target
audiences overlap.'
The court has been unable to produce a precise rule of determin-
ing when an identity of advertising efforts exists, however,
particularly if one party is engaged in national campaigns, while
the other's efforts are more narrowly targeted. In Exxon, for
example, the court found that the defendant could not escape a
negative application of this factor by showing that its advertising
was aimed specifically at the Houston market, while the plaintiffs
promotional efforts had no such narrow focus.' In contrast,
however, the court in Amstar Corp. V. Domino's Pizza, Inc.310
relied upon just such a distinction in holding that the plaintiffs
advertising campaign "in nationally circulated magazines, newspa-
pers and trade journals, and [expenditure of] substantial sums of
money on radio and television commercials" was distinct from the
defendant's efforts, which were "targeted at young, male college
students.""'1
Assuming that dissimilarities do, in fact, exist, the court also has
reached varying results on the weight to be given them. The court
has, for example, recognized the converse of the rule set forth in
Exxon, namely, that dissimilarities are probative of the absence of
a likelihood of confusion."s In contrast, however, the court in at
least one case has upheld the district court's determination that
" Id. at 506,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 388; see also John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 976-77, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 525 (l1th Cir. 1983) (affirming finding
of likelihood of confusion due, inter alia, to strong similarity of advertising campaigns);
Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474,478, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611,
614 (th Cir. 1974) (noting that finding of infringement is more likely where, as here, both
companies used VW symbol and Tbug" idea in their respective advertising campaigns).
08 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1166, 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982).
3 628 F.2d at 506, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 389; see also Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan
Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 191, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91, 95 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)
(vacating directed verdict in defendant's favor even though defendant's product sold in small,
specific markets while plaintiffs product sold and marketed nationally).
3'0 615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
3"lId. at 262, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978.
'
1 See, eg., Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1185,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
123, 129 (lth Cir.) (upholding trial court's determination that customer similarity did not
contribute to likelihood of confusion in sophisticated real estate field), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
845 (1985).
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differences in the parties' advertising may be ignored if the
relevant industry is one in which " 'advertising habits can change
at will,' "which raises the possibility that the parties' promotional
efforts will converge in the future."1 3
F. DEFENDANTS INTENT
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, Inc.,14
the former Fifth Circuit articulated a classic formulation of the
early common-law test of infringement818 that was to remain
influential even after the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act and
the adoption of the Roto-Rooter factors:
[Miore significant and important... is the purpose
evidenced by the choice, by this new comer into the
field ... of name and advertising matter. This
purpose is to project itself into that business arena
panoplied in a name already favorably known, rather
than to come into it on its own merits, and slowly
building, here a little, there a little, establish its own
place.... [W]here as here it plainly appears that
there is a purpose to reap where one has not sown,
to gather where one has not planted, to build upon
the work and reputation of another, the use of the
advertising or trade name or distinguishing mark of
another, is in its nature, fraudulent and will be
enjoined.316
3- Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 842-43, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 18-19
(11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Jelibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 175
(N.D. Ga. 1981)).
For a case using analogous reasoning, but reaching a contrary result, see Armstrong Cork
Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 25-26 (5th Cir.)
(finding no likelihood of confusion in part because *It]here is nothing in the record that
suggests that [the defendant] will deviate from its own present policy of [advertising]..
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
' 123 F.2d 582, 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435 (th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942).
31 See aupra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
316 123 F.2d at 584, 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 427-38.
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Indeed, although bad faith is not a prerequisite to a finding of
liability, 1 ' as with the similarity between marks factor under the
Boston Professional Hockey per se rule, 18 the court has suggested
that a defendant's improper intent in and of itself may justify a
finding of liability.s19 In Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan
Research & Development Inc., 2 for example, the court reversed
a directed verdict for the defendant manufacturer of suntan lotion
against the plaintiffs charges that the defendant's packaging was
confusingly similar to its own. Although holding that a variety of
factors justified submitting the case to the jury, the court found
that one merited particular mention:
The linchpin of [the plaintiffs] case was Weisburg's
testimony that he had been instructed to copy the
Native Tan bottle. Evidence of intentional deception
carries special weight in the calculus of determining
likelihood of confusion. Indeed, proof that a defen-
dant chose a mark with the intent of copying [a]
plaintiffs mark, standing alone, may justify an
317 While intent is of some probative value, particularly ff a bad intent is shown, it is
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for determining the ultimate legal fact of the
'likelihood of confusion.'" Jelfibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 843 n.23, 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19 n.23 (11th Cir. 1983). See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,831-32,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745,754 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting
that relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not intent to infringe); Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 385, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 664 (5th
Cir. 1977) (stating that intent is relevant, but not essential, to finding of unfair competition);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474,478, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611,
614 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that intent is not necessary element of tort of unfair competi-
tion); American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619,625,136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286,
290 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating that absence of intent to mislead was not defense, but merely one
factor of many to be considered).
11 See supra notes 261-273 and accompanying text.
83 Although the former Fifth Circuit observed in B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement
Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 780 (5th Cir. 1971), that intent has no
relevance to a finding of infiingement, id. at 124, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 787, the court has
rejected this position. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d
1160, 1164 n.4, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 602 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting rejection of B.H.
Bunn standard by subsequent Fifth Circuit cases).
m 656 F.2d 186, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
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inference of confusing similarity."1
Precisely what merits a finding of bad faith' warranting
invocation of this rule, however, is unclear. A defendant may, of
course, admit that his actions were calculated to capitalize upon the
plaintiff's popularity. In University of Georgia Athletic Ass'n v.
Laite, 3 for example, the defendant manufacturer of BATTLIN'
BULLDOG beer did not dispute the plaintiffs claims that he
sought to sell his beer not by relying on its taste, but instead by
attracting the attention of University of Georgia football fans.32'
Likewise, in Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer,32 both the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit relied on the defendants' repeated pre-
trial assertions that they were going to drive the plaintiff lamp
manufacturer out of business by flooding the market with cheap
'2'Id. at 190,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 94-95; see also Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d
1165, 1172,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128,1133 (llth Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that intent
creates rebuttable presumption of likelihood of confusion); Sun Banks v. Sun Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 318-19, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844, 851 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing
import of deliberately adopting another's mark to capitalize on reputation and resulting
confusion); Exxon Motor Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 506, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
384, 389 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that intent alone could provide inference of confusing
similarity); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252,263,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969,
978 (5th Cir.) (noting that intent to adopt identical name would have been critical factor),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). But see Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft,
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831-32, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754 (11th Cir. 1982) ('1he defendant's
intent to tread on the goodwill of the plaintiff, while certainly a relevant factor in
establishing a likelihood of confusion, is not the only factor." (citation omitted)).
Significantly, this rule presupposes that the plaintiff has a protectable mark, as " '[t]here
is nothing wrong with exact copying of an article or a symbol in the public domain.'" John
H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,977 n.16, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515,525
n.16 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEmARKS AND UNFAm COMPTIr ON
§ 23:35, at 111-12 (2d ed. 1984)).
Like the other factors making up the likelihood of confusion analysis, a trial court's
determination of whether bad faith intent exists is a question of fact and not to be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous. Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear, Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476, 19
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1068, 1070-71 (lth Cir. 1991).
n 756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (l1th Cir. 1985).
a' Id. at 1545, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1129. See also Miami Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Credit
Bureau, Inc., 276 F.2d 565, 568, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1960) (upholding trial
court's finding of likely confusion in part because "in a colloquy between the trial judge and
[the defendant] the latter virtually admitted that he picked out the (plaintiff's] trade name
and used it in the telephone directory in the hope that those looking for a credit bureau
would find the name and come to him").
941 F.2d 1165, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128 (l1th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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imitations of its products to find that the defendants had intended
to infringe the plaintiffs trade dress.32
Such cases obviously are rare, with plaintiffs usually being forced
to rely on circumstantial evidence to prove bad faith intent. At
least one pre-Roto-Rooter decision held that adoption of a mark
with knowledge of an earlier established use constitutes an
impermissible intent because "a man intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts."3 More recent decisions,
however, have required more, with the court in Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc. s' noting that "[blad faith in the adoption
and use of a trademark normally involves the imitation of packag-
ing material, use of identical code numbers, adopting of similar
distribution methods or other efforts by a party to 'pass off its
product as that of another."' 2  Other factors accepted by the
court as probative evidence of bad faith include an attempt by the
defendant to get as close as possible to the plaintiffs mark without
infringing' and the defendant's otherwise unexplained depar-
Id. at 1172, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
Thompson v. Alpine Motor Lodge, Inc., 296 F.2d 497,499,131 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453,455
(5th Cir. 1961).
3" 615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
Id. at 263, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978.
"oSee, eg., National Aas'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d
374, 377, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that where infringer tries to
initate mark as closely as possible, courts will follow infringer's judgment and find likelihood
of confusion); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co., 30 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1929)
(per curiam) (finding infringement where infringer attempted to come as close to mark as
it could without incurring legal liability). Under these circumstances, that a defendant may
have sought legal advice as to how close it could come to the plaintiffs mark does not
preclude its infringement from being considered intentional. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 977-78, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 525-26 (11th Cir. 1983).
Note that this factor is not triggered by a defendant's mere adoption of a mark with
knowledge of the plaintiffs prior use of the same mark. See El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe,
214 F.2d 721, 726, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1954) (upholding district court's
finding that confusion was unlikely, in part because "though the defendants knew of
plaintiffs use of the name, they further knew that the plaintiff did not have an exclusive
right to such use as against a noncompeting business"). Of perhaps equal significance in
trade dress cases, that a defendant created its design while in possession of the plaintiffs
design does not necessarily trigger a finding of bad faith intent to copy, particularly if the
plaintiffs design was only one of many studied by the defendant. See Ross Bicycles, Inc. v.
Cycles USA, Inc., 765 F.2d 1502, 1508, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 879, 880 (11th Cir. 1985)
(adopting district court opinion that merely testing another company's bicycle did not show
intent to copy, especially where almost every component differed between two bicycles).
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ture from its prior mark usage. 1
G. ACTUAL CONFUSION
As reflected in the Roto-Rooter test itself, although it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to show that a defendant's actions have
created actual confusion,332 its existence weighs heavily in favor
of an ultimate determination that confusion is likely. The court
repeatedly has underscored this point:
While this circuit regards the question of confusion
as a fact determination, it is not necessary to show
actual confusion. One merely has to show that the
likelihood of confusion exists. There can be no more
positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of
confusion than proof of actual confusion. Moreover,
reason tells us that while very little proof of actual
confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood
of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of
proof would be necessary to refute such proof.'
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 843, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19 (11th
Cir. 1983).
Although the court has identified these factors in the context of the likelihood of confusion
standard for liability, questions of a defendant's intent also arise in cases considering
whether a successful plaintiff is entitled to treble damages and attorneys fees under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1988). In such cases, the court has held that a defendant's willful blindness
to the unauthorized nature of its goods can, in and of itself, constitute bad faith intent. See
Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear, Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068,
1070-71 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that willful blindness may provide requisite intent or bad
faith).
I See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1171, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128
(11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d
186, 191, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91, 95 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor
Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 506, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1980); Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 386, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649,
665 (5th Cir. 1977); Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363, 366, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
516,518 (5th Cir. 1965); Abramson v. Coro, Inc. 240 F.2d 854,857,112 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 307,
308-309 (5th Cir. 1957).
m World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrells New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489, 168
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609, 615 (5th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted); accord Roto-Rooter Corp. v.
O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Although its statement is straightforward, applications of this
rule have proven far less so. Indeed, it is on the subject of actual
confusion that the court's decisions are perhaps themselves most
confusing. This judicial disagreement has occurred primarily with
respect to two types of actual confusion evidence, namely, (1)
misdirected communications and inquiries; and (2) actual confusion
surveys commissioned by the litigants.
1. Misdirected Communications and Inquiries. The first type of
evidence typically accepted by the court as probative of actual
confusion is a plaintiff's documentation of unsolicited and misdirect-
ed contacts. These contacts can consist of consumer inquiries
regarding the possible affiliation between the partiess " or at-
tempts to purchase goods or services actually offered by the other
party.s  They also may consist of inquiries from nonconsum-
ers 6  or misdirected correspondence such as bills"7  or let-
' See, e.g., Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1515, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 557
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding evidence of customers assuming two business were affiliated
strongly probative oflikely confusion); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,
675 F.2d 1160, 1167, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Roto-Rooter, 513
F.2d at 46,186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 74 (same); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard,
492 F.2d 474, 478, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
m See, eg., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 978-79, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515,526-27 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming partial jury verdict in plaintiffs favor
based on misdirected purchase orders); Original Appalachian Artworks, In= v. Toy Loft, Inc.,
684 F.2d 821,832 & n.17, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745,754 & n.17 (11th Cir. 1982) (considering
mistaken purchase of defendant's product by would-be customer of plaintiff probative
evidence of actual confusion); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368, 386, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 665 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding finding of
infringement in part on evidence of actual confusion among plaintiffs franchisees);
Professional Golfers As'n v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670, 186 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding finding of infringement in part on testimony of
members of plaintiff association mistakenly expecting to be able to play golf at course
operated by defendant); Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797, 102
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271,274 (5th Cir. 1954) (finding consumer testimony ofmistaken purchasing
decisions probative of likely confusion); Greyhound Corp. v. Goberna, 128 F.2d 806, 807, 54
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45,4 (5th Cir. 1942) (noting significance of defendant's admissions of actual
confusion caused by parties' mutual use of word "Greyhound' in reversing verdict for
defendant).
, See, eg., University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1122,1130 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that inquiries from fans concerned about product
endorsement by university were evidence of actual confusion); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating
Clubs, 716 F.2d 833,843,222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that concerned
inquiries from three of plaintiffs friends and associates, who thought defendant's business
was plaintiffs, constituted evidence of actual confusion); World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrel's
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The doctrinal problems posed by such communications are two-
fold. First, the court has adopted inconsistent approaches in its
treatment of communications from individuals who are not actual
purchasers of the parties' goods or services. In at least two cases,
American Television & Communications Corp. v. American
Communications & Television, Inc.' and Freedom Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Way,' the court accorded little weight to the
plaintiffs proffered evidence of mistaken inquiries about the
parties' possible affiliation on the ground that none of the would-be
confusion victims was a potential customer of either of the par-
ties.3
41
In contrast, however, most of the court's decisions addressing the
issue have found probative any sort of actual confusion, provided
that it may fairly be traced to a protectable aspect of the plaintiffs
mark or trade dress." In John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc.,' for example, the plaintiff check manufacturer introduced
evidence that two bank employees had, at the request of customers,
correctly filled out order forms for the defendant's products, but had
mistakenly inserted the plaintiffs putative mark onto the forms.
New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609, 615 (5th Cir. 1971)
(considering misdirected telephone calls from retailers probative of actual confusion).
3 See, eg., Safeway, 675 F.2d at 1167, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 604 (noting that
misdirected letter from creditor warrants little weight); Conara, 743 F.2d at 1515 n.10, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 557 n.10 (noting that billing invoices sent to defendant for plaintiffs
purchases constituted evidence of actual confusion).
I See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969,
978 (5th Cir.) (noting misaddressed letter as evidence of actual confusion), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 899 (1980); Miami Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 276 F.2d 565, 567, 125
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 87, 88 (5th Cir. 1960) (relying upon evidence of mail delays caused by
similarity of mark to uphold $3000 infringement verdict).
" 810 F.2d 1546, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084 (11th Cir. 1987).
m0 757 F.2d 1176, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
34 See American Television, 810 F.2d at 1550, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2087 (noting
importance that plaintiffs evidence of actual confusion didn't involve consumers); Freedom
Say. & Loan, 757 F.2d at 1185, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 129 (finding mistaken inquiries of
firm's president's friends irrelevant).
8' For a case in which the court accorded little weight to the plaintiffs actual confusion
evidence because it required 'rank speculation! whether the confusion had been caused by
the defendant's use of its marks (as opposed to some other reason), see Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Out in America, Inc., 481 F.2d 445, 448-449, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 259 (5th Cir.
1973).
~'711 F.2d 96, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515 (11th Cir. 1983).
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On the defendant's appeal from an adverse jury verdict, the court
acknowledged that [a]dmittedly, neither instance involved an
intended order for [the plaintiffs product] which was misdirected
to [the defendant], and neither instance indicated that bank
customers, the ultimate consumers, were confused."" Without
reference to its earlier holding in Freedom Savings & Loan that
actual confusion among consumers was the relevant inquiry, the
court observed that "we believe that the jury reasonably could have
inferred that there was a likelihood of confusion from the evidence
that there was at least some actual confusion among persons
responsible for marketing and processing the orders for the
[competing] check products."'
Consistent with John H. Harland, the court also has accepted as
evidence of actual confusion inquiries or communications from
prospective employees,3 " creditors,'" and the plaintiffs inves-
tors.3" The admission of such evidence does not necessarily
mean it should be accorded equal weight, however, for "[s]hort-lived
confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a
business is worthy of little weight, while confusion of actual
customers of a business is worthy of substantial weight."' "
The second area of doctrinal confusion created by this type of
evidence involves the magnitude of confusion a plaintiff must show
before he is entitled to relief. To a certain extent, the varying
treatment of instances of actual confusion is intentional for, as the
-" Id. at 978-79, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 526-27 (footnotes omitted).
s" Id. at 979, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527. The Harand court was equally unreceptive
to the defendant's reliance on an employee's testimony that she was not confused, but 'she
'simply wrote down the wrng thing by mistake.* As to this contention, the court remarked,
"w]e do not see the relevance of the distinction [the defendant] is attempting to draw
because the Lanham Act prohibits use of a mark which is likely... to cause mistake' as well
as a mark which is likely to cause confusion or to deceive." Id. at 978 n.20, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 526 n.20 (citations omitted); see also Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46,
186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Cross-examination, rather than demonstrating
carelessness or inadvertence, showed that four persons had made their mistakes because of
reliance upon similarity of defendants' name to that of plaintiffs.").
' Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508,1515 n.10, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552,557 n.10
(11th Cir. 1984).
, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167, 216
U.S.P.Q. 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982).
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 843-44, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19
(11th Cir. 1983).
"9 Safeway Stores, 675 F.2d at 1167, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 604 (citation omitted).
1994] 127
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court noted in AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,' "[tihere is no absolute
scale as to how many instances of actual confusion establish the
existence of that factor. Rather, the court must evaluate the
evidence of actual confusion in the light of the totality of the
circumstances involved." 1
This sliding scale at times has resulted in apparently inconsis-
tent results. In AmBrit, for example, the court found probative of
a likelihood of confusion the testimony of four witnesses that they
had been misled while making purchases in the marketplace. Over
the strident objections of the defendant, which claimed that this
number was insignificant in light of the parties' overall sales, the
court noted:
Viewed in the light of the totality of the circumstanc-
es, [the defendant's] protestations are without merit.
With respect to [the defendants] assertion that the
reported instances of confusion are small given the
high volume of sales, we note that it takes very little
evidence to establish the existence of the actual
confusion factor. Moreover, that there were only a
few reported instances of actual confusion does not
mean that only these individuals were actually
onfused. .... It is likely that many consumers who
were confused never realized they had been confused
and that many of those who did realize they had
been confused chose not to spend the time to register
a complaint with a faceless corporation .... 32
3w 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
Iw d. at 1543, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. The court offered another formulation of
these guidelines in Jellibeans, 716 F.2d at 844, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 20 (citation omitted):
[(fn determining the sufficiency of the evidence to prove actual confusion,
a court should examine the totality of the circumstances to determine
how likely instances of confusion would be reported. This examination
may include consideration of the time period in question and how
extensively the product is advertised and made known to the public, as
well as the type of confusion that exists and who suffers the confusion.
su 812 F.2d at 1544, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
128 (Vol. 2:57
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Relying on much the same analysis, the court has held one,u
two, three,m four," thirteen,' and "approximately ten
(10) to fiften (15)'i instances of misdirected communications or
inquiries probative of actual confusion, and indeed, has entered or
upheld judgment as a matter of law based in part on two" and
four' such instances.36'
In contrast to this line of cases, the court has found comparable
numbers unconvincing in cases in which instances of actual
confusion have occurred over long periods of time. InAmstar Corp.
v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,' for example, the court found that the
context in which actual confusion had arisen weighed in the
defendant's, rather than the plaintiffs, favor:
The evidence of actual confusion in this case is
minimal. Plaintiffs evidence of actual confusion
amounted to two verbal inquiries as to whether
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832 n.17, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754 n.17 (11th Cir. 1982).
3- John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 978, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
515, 526 (11th Cir. 1983).
8" Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 843-44, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19-20
(11th Cir. 1983).
e AmBrit, Inc v. Kraft, Inc. 812 F.2d 1531, 1544, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1171 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
"8 Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co., 335 F.2d 72, 74, 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
289, 291 (5th Cir. 1964).
' University of Ga. Athletic Asa'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1122, 1130 (11th Cir. 1985).
" Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1162, 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 599, 601 (11th Cir. 1982). But see Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets,
Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 506, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 26 (5th Cir.) (finding no likelihood of
confusion as matter of law, notwithstanding apparent evidence of two instances of actual
confusion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73, 74 (5th Cir.
1975).
1l Significantly, the court's willingness to accord weight to few instances of actual
confusion does not extend to a willingness to consider testimony by a defendant's witnesses
that they were not confused. See, eg., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 n.69,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,1172 n.69 (11th Cir. 1986) ('Kraft offered the testimony of several
consumers who testified that they had not been confused. The district court properly
disregarded this evidence. If Kraft could not find at least a handful of consumers who would
agree to testify that they had not been confused, it might as well have defaulted.*), ert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
88 615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
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"Domino's Pizza" was related to "Domino" sugar, and
one misaddressed letter. In view of the fact that
both plaintiff's and defendant's sales currently run
into the millions of dollars each year, these isolated
instances of confusion are insufficient to sustain a
finding of a likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the fact
that only three instances of actual confusion were
found after nearly 15 years of extensive concurrent
sales under the parties' respective marks raises a
presumption against likelihood of confusion in the
future.s0
The court reached a similar result in Sun Banks v. Sun Federal
Savings & Loan As'n, ' in which it was equally unimpressed
with the plaintiff's evidence of "less than fifteen instances" of
alleged actual confusion over a three-year period. As the Sun
Banks court noted of this pattern, "[alithough the record contains
several isolated instances of uncertainty whether there was a
connection between the two businesses, in light of the number of
transactions conducted and the extent of the parties' advertising,
the amount of past confusion is negligible."m
2. Survey Evidence. Other than misdirected inquiries and
communications, the most favored evidence of actual confusion is
that arising from surveys conducted by the parties. Although the
court's more recent holdings have proven somewhat more receptive
to surveys, its early decisions left considerable doubt over their
worth. In substantial part, this was the result of litigants'
tendency to employ word-association questionnaires that asked
respondents "what comes to mind" when they were presented with
particular marks.'" Although the court initially treated such
31 Id. at 263, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978-79 (footnote and citations omitted).
3' 651 F.2d 311, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844 (5th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 319, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 851.
' See, eg., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 445, 447-48, 178
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) (giving little weight to word-association survey that
did not account for influence of common term 'Holiday,*); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States
Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 171-72, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 25-26 (5th Cir.) (holding survey
with questions such as "What does the brand KODAK mean to you?* irrelevant and thus
inadmissible), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
(Vol. 2:57130
74
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss1/3
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE
surveys as inadmissible hearsay, W it later retreated from that
position in favor of a rule admitting the studies, but according them
limited weight: As the court noted approvingly in Holiday Inns, Inc.
v. Holiday Out in America, Inc., "[i]n this case, the trial court found
that the survey degenerated into a mere word-association test
entitled to little weight because the format failed to account for the
number of responses attributable to use of the word 'Holiday' as
distinguished from the service mark HOLIDAY OUT."m
By the late 1970's, however, one litigant had discovered survey
methodology that would satisfy the court's standards.' In Exxon
Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange,7" the plaintiff introduced into
evidence a survey that, as in Holiday Inns, inquired "What is the
first thing that comes to mind when looking at this sign?"""1 In
contrast to the earlier case, however, the plaintiff's instructions to
its interviewers went on to read, "What was there about the sign
that made you say that? (PROBE FULLY). 72  Relying on the
presence of this question, the court not only found the survey
admissible, but probative as well.37
Assuming that a plaintiff designs its survey to elicit the causes
of a respondent's confusion, the next methodological hurdle it must
pass is a demonstration that the survey has targeted the proper
universe. The leading case on this subject is Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc.,"' in which the court found critical defects
in a survey intended to demonstrate that the defendant's use of a
similar mark on pizza was likely to create confusion with the
plaintiff's mark for sugar. Although the survey was accorded
significant weight at trial, the former Fifth Circuit found the
district court's treatment of it critically deficient:
See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 246 F.2d at 171-72, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 25-26 (ruling
survey inadmissible as hearsay when offered to prove answers received by ten interviewers).
481 F.2d at 448, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258.
"Others, however, continued to employ impermissible 'word-association" surveys, with
disastrous results. See, eg., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264, 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 979 (5th Cir.) (holding that word-association survey presented no
meaningful evidence of actual confusion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
80 628 F.2d 500, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384 (5th Cir. 1980).
71 Id. at 508, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 391.
Id., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 391.
Id. at 506-07, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 389-390.
'7' 615 F.2d 252, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
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[O]ne of the most important factors in assessing the
validity of an opinion poll is the adequacy of the
"survey universe," that is, the persons interviewed
must adequately represent the opinions which are
relevant to the litigation. The appropriate universe
should include a fair sampling of those purchasers
most likely to partake of the alleged infringer's goods
or services.3'5
Applying this standard, the appellate court found that the survey's
universe, which included primarily housewives in cities in which
the defendants did not operate, "neglected completely defendants'
primary customers-young, single, male college students." Under
these circumstances, the court held, "we do not believe that the
proper universe was examined, and the results of the survey must
therefore be discounted."37
6
H. OTHER FACTORS
Under appropriate circumstances, "'new' factors may merit
consideration" in the likelihood of confusion analysis. 77 Consis-
tent with this philosophy, the court has, on a case-by-case basis,
included within its analysis additional elements, including:
1. The Degree of Care Used by Purchasers. Perhaps the most
significant additional factor employed by the court is the degree to
which the parties' customers are likely to exercise care when
purchasing their products. In Armstrong Cork Co. v. World
Carpets, Inc.,8 the federal registrant of the WORLD trademark
for carpet sought to enjoin one of its competitors from changing its
-6 Id. at 264, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 979 (citation omitted).
376 Id., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 979.
On the subject of survey universes, both Amatar, 615 F.2d at 264, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at
979, and a separate panel of the court in Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe
Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 861 n.16, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 536, 541 n.16 (11th Cir. 1983), cited
approvingly the guidelines contained in the Judicial Conference Study Group's Handbook of
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1958).
' Swatch Watch, SA. v. Taxor, Inc., 785 F.2d 956, 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 392
(11th Cir. 1986).
'r 448 F. Supp. 1072,199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (N.D. Ga. 1978), rev'd in part and affd in
part, 597 F.2d 496, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
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corporate name to "Armstrong World Industries, Inc." The district
court agreed that confusion was likely to result from this change;
the former Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed. Although grounding
its decision largely in differences between the parties' uses of their
respective names, the latter tribunal also held the nature of the
parties' goods probative, noting that confusion was particularly
unlikely "since a person buying a 'big ticket' item such as carpeting
would ordinarily be expected to be a more careful buyer than the
impulse purchaser or the purchaser of a relatively inexpensive
item.n3 79
An application of this factor, however, does not necessarily
always weigh in favor of defendants. In Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v.
Suntan Research & Development Inc.,sso the district court dis-
posed of the plaintiff suntan-lotion manufacturer's trade dress
claims by directing a verdict for the defendant. Vacating this
action on the plaintiffs appeal, the court of appeals proceeded
through the standard likelihood of confusion analysis before adding
the following consideration: "Finally, since suntan preparations are
relatively inexpensive items the buyer may take less care in
shopping and selecting the product, thereby increasing the risk of
confusion." 1 A similar pattern occurred in AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft,
Inc.,32 in which the court upheld a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff ice cream manufacturer in part on the ground that "[ilce
cream novelties are an impulse item that consumers purchase
without a great deal of care."33
2. Prior Affiliation of the Parties. A prior affiliation of the
parties is an additional factor often considered by the court, albeit
one that typically weighs in favor of a finding of infringement.
Most frequently, this factor is invoked in cases involving former or
"runaway" franchisees. In Professional Golfers Ass'n v. Bankers
m 597 F.2d at 504 n.10, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 25 n.10. For another case approving
consideration, albeit in a cursory manner, of the price charged for the parties' products to
reach a defense verdict, see Swatch Watch, 785 F.2d at 958, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 392.
' 656 F.2d 186, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
-Id. at 191, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 95.
' 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
m Id. at 1544, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
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Life & Casualty Co.,' for example, the defendant operated a golf
course and club house that, for ten years, housed the plaintiff's
headquarters and prominently featured the plaintiffs mark. Upon
the termination of the parties' contractual relationship, the
defendant continued to use the mark in the operation of its course,
prompting the plaintiff to sue. Upholding a judgment in the
plaintiff's favor, the court noted "[a] former licensee cannot mislead
the public into believing that its affiliation continues once the
licensing arrangement has ceased. For once the contract ends, a
licensee's right to the mark ends, and any subsequent use consti-
tutes infringement."tm Indeed, the court since has suggested that
such situations warrant entry of summary judgment in franchisors'
favor on the ground that "[clommon sense compels the conclusion
that a strong risk of consumer confusion arises when a terminated
franchisee continues to use the former franchisor's trade-
marks.-3t
The probative nature of past affiliation of the parties has not
been limited to franchise situations. In Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v.
Suntan Research & Development, Inc.,38 7 the defendant, prior to
entering the market as a manufacturer, had distributed the
plaintiff's suntan product through its poolside stands. In vacating
a directed verdict for the defendant, the court relied on the parties'
relationship as evidence warranting submission of the case to a
jury: "This past supplier-distributor relationship ... is also
probative evidence of likelihood of confusion.""
3. Prior Finding of Infringement. Consistent with the general
principle that a prior relationship between the parties may weigh
514 F.2d 665, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447 (11th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 670, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 451 (citations omitted); see also Ramada Inns, Inc.
v. Gadsden Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562, 1566-67, 1 U.SP.Q.2d (BNA) 1011, 1014-1015 (11th
Cir. 1986) (noting that holding trademark infringement damages are not recoverable from
immediate ex-franchise would be contrary to purposes behind Lanhm Act and might
encourage other infringers to *hold over).
' Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 693,701 (11th
Cir. 1983).
" 656 F.2d 186, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
m Id. at 191, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 95. But see AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d
1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's finding of likely
confusion without discussion of past supplier-distributor relationship between parties), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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in favor of likely confusion, the court has generally held that a
defendant under a prior injunction is under a greater duty to avoid
encroaching upon the plaintiff's rights than it might otherwise have
been. In Eskay Drugs, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laborato-
ries,' for example, the plaintiff drug manufacturer and owner of
the ESKAY mark had succeeded in enjoining the defendants' use
of its mark "or any colorable imitation thereof," only to have the
defendants change their labels and name to ENKAY.3" The
court, however, was not amused by the defendants' actions, and
upheld the district court's summary finding of contempt by
observing:
In such a case as this, where the [defendants] have
been found guilty of infringing the trade-mark rights
of others, they should thereafter be required to keep
a safe distance away from the dividing line between
violation of, and compliance with, the injunction.
They must do more than see how close they can come
with safety to that which they were enjoined from
doing.391
The court faced a similar situation in Howard Johnson Co. v.
Khimani," in which several runaway franchisees were enjoined
from further use of the plaintiff's marks. In response, the defen-
dants resumed operations under the name H.J. INNS, notwith-
standing their knowledge of widespread usage among the plaintiffs
franchisees of the letters H.J. As it had in Eskay Drugs, the court
was more than willing to uphold the district court's finding of
contempt, noting that "[tihis is not the case of a lodge or restaurant
owner using his or her own initials to name an establishment,
unaware that a similar trademarked name was used by another
facility." Rather, the court found, "there was evidence.., that the
defendants deliberately sought a name that 'would be close to
Howard Johnson's name, yet ... not infringe.'
- 188 F.2d 430,89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (5th Cir. 1951).
NId. at 431, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203.
O'Id. at 432, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203-204 (footnote omitted).
'n 892 F.2d 1512, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808 (11th Cir. 1990).3 Id. at 1518, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
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4. Use of Several of the Plaintiffs Marks. In Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard,8" the plaintiff automobile manufac-
turer had brought suit in response to the defendants' operation of
a garage specializing in the repair and maintenance of the plain-
tiff's cars. In contrast to the usual case of alleged infringement,
however, the defendant used several of the plaintiffs marks. In
affirming the district court's holding of infringement, the former
Fifth Circuit court found such conduct particularly objectionable,
concluding that "[the defendants] utilized not one, but five of [the
plaintiff's] marks, the cumulative effect of which is greater
likelihood of confusion. 39 5
Not all the court's decisions accord such weight to apparent
multiple acts of infringement, however. In Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Out in America, Inc.,' for example, the court was
unswayed by the plaintiffs arguments in upholding a defense
verdict. Significantly, this holding occurred in the face of the
defendant's use of HOLIDAY OUT, HOLIDAY OUT IN AMERICA,
and THE NATION'S CAMPGROUND, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's prior rights to its HOLIDAY INN, HOLIDAY INN OF
AMERICA, and THE NATION'S INNKEEPER marks."
5. Geographic Proximity. Under certain circumstances, the
geographical proximity of the parties can play a role in the
likelihood of confusion calculus. On a basic level, cases examining
the distance between the parties generally have involved the
plaintiffs ownership of an unregistered mark, the rights to which
necessarily are limited to the plaintiff's zone of operation. Thus, for
example, in the early case of Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Houston
Printing Co., the court held that confusion was unlikely sub-
stantially because the parties operated in distinct areas." In
contrast, however, the court held two hundred miles' worth of
separation to be an inadequate barrier against confusion in Rhea
v. Bacon,40 in light of the fact that the parties were "connected
492 F.2d 474, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 479, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 614.
481 F.2d 445, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 447, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258.
11 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 273 U.S. 694 (1926).
tId. at 835.
87 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1937).
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by paved highways and, with modern means of transportation,
come into direct competition with each other to the same extent as,
in the days of horse drawn vehicles, they would have done if located
only a few miles apart." 1
The question of geographic proximity also may arise in cases in
which a federal registrant seeks to enforce its rights against an
apparently distant second user of the same mark. According to the
court's decisions in American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc. 
4M
and John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 4M such a plaintiff will be
able to challenge a defendant's use only when that plaintiff expands
into the junior user's geographical area. If, as in John R. Thomp-
son, the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate its imminent expansion,
"then there will be no occasion to interfere with the defendants' use
of their tradename."' If, however, "future expansion of the
plaintiff's business or reputation does occur and confusion becomes
likely, the rights of the plaintiff are definitely superior to those of
the defendants.' °
Determining the plaintiff's actual areas of operations is not
always the end of the inquiry, however, particularly in cases
involving rights to unregistered marks. Rather, under the "zone of
natural expansion doctrine," "[tihe territorial extent of trademark
protection is limited to those geographic areas in which a mark is
actually used in commerce and a zone of reasonable future
expansion. '  Thus, if a plaintiff can demonstrate its imminent
expansion into an area, its priority of rights will extend to that
area.
01o Id. at 977.
312 F.2d 619, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (th Cir. 1963).
366 F.2d 108, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 728 (th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 116, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 734.
• Id., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 734.
Significantly, this rule applies with equal force in situations involving plaintiffs who are
junior users but who own incontestable federal registrations. Because the effect of such a
registration is to freeze the senior user into its area of operations, the owner of an
incontestable registration will be able to restrict a senior user's rights to that user's 'zone
of reputation.' See Siragusa v. Travelodge Corp., 352 F.2d 516,147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 379 (5th
Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (enjoining junior user from using its mark at all and failing to enjoin
senior user from using its mark in Birmingham, only place junior user had used mark), afg
228 F. Supp. 238, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 719 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
'w Tally.Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist, 889 F.2d 1018,1027, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1133, 1140 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
1994] 137
81
Davis: Likelihood of Confusion Determinations: A Survey of Eleventh Circ
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
As the court has noted, the zone of natural expansion doctrine "is
admittedly a legal fiction," and with one "few firm guidelines.' r
The court has, however, endeavored to provide a loose doctrinal
framework for district courts and litigants attempting to determine
the plaintiffs likely geographical expansion. Several factors merit
consideration in this framework, including: (1) the geographical
distance from the senior user's actual location to a point on the
perimeter of the zone of expansion; (2) the scope of the senior user's
actual geographical area of penetration at the time of suit; (3) the
senior user's past history of expansion; and (4) whether the senior
user's actual expansion into the junior user's area would require
"an unusual 'great leap forward' " or, alternatively, whether "that
expansion would be... a logical, gradual, step of the same length
as those previously made."' Should the senior user demonstrate
the natural inevitability of its penetration into a territory occupied
by the junior user of an otherwise confusingly similar mark, it will
prevail in any infringement dispute.
CONCLUSION
In affirming the trial court's verdict in American Foods, Inc. v.
Golden Flake, Inc.,' then-Circuit Judge Griffin Bell distin-
guished the authority cited by the defendant by noting that "[tihe
ancient observation that each trade-mark case must be decided
upon its own facts still obtains .... "'1 As this Article has
demonstrated, however, likelihood of confusion determinations in
the Eleventh Circuit, perhaps more so than in many other jurisdic-
tions, have produced a well developed and broad-based body of law
applicable to each of the cases referenced by Judge Bell's "ancient
observation."
It is to set forth and to explain this jurisprudence that this
Article has surveyed the court's decisions involving competing
claims to trademarks, service marks, trade dresses, and other
designations of origin. To this end, this Article has not endeavored
" Id. at 1028, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
Id. at 1028, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
312 F.2d 619, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286 (5th Cir. 1963).
'
tm Id. at 627, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 292.
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to criticize the ultimate outcome of the individual cases discussed
in it. It has, however, sought to articulate and to reconcile the
well-developed doctrinal principles characteristic of unfair competi-
tion litigation in the Eleventh Circuit to accord litigants, if not
absolute confidence in the likely outcome of their cases, then a
reasonable degree of certainty.
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